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CRIME, MORAL LUCK, AND THE SERMON ON
THE MOUNT
Craig A. Stern*
Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou
shalt not commit adultery: But I say unto you, that whosoever
looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery
with her already in his heart.
-The Gospel According to Saint Matthew, Chapter 5, Verses 27
& 28.'
Humans are religious beings. Everything we do expresses fundamental
presuppositions. We cannot escape often revealing our views of life and
death, right and wrong, freedom and constraint; views based ultimately
on faith, not demonstration. That law and morality bespeak religious
2doctrine, therefore, is no surprise.
One would think, then, that religious doctrine might be consulted
when trying to understand a supposedly intractable problem of law and
morality. Regarding such problems, we often consult history, economics,
sociology, or psychology.3  These sources are valuable indeed. But,
should we ignore the religion of the judges who formulated, the lawyers
*Associate Professor, Regent University Law School. B.A., 1975, Yale University; J.D.,
1978, University of Virginia. The author thanks Mary Bunch, Lee Copeland, Bob Cynkar,
James Duane, Gary Greig, Chris Kachouroff, Joe Kickasola, Keith Rothfus, Mike Schutt,
Jeff Tuomala, John Tuskey, Eric Welsh, Rod Williams, Regent University, and my be-
loved and loving family, for their assistance and support.
1. All citations to the Bible in this Article refer to the King James Version. N.B.: In
this version, italics indicate words supplied by the translators without a verbal equivalent
in the original texts.
2. See, e.g., John E. Witte, Jr. & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses of the Law: A
Protestant Source of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment?, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 433, 434
(1994). Professors Witte and Arthur explain that
[jiurists and theologians, statesmen and churchmen collaborated closely in the
formulation of modern Anglo-American theories of crime and punishment. The
concepts of crime and criminal law which they developed drew upon analogous
concepts of sin and natural law. The measures and purposes of criminal punish-
ment which they chose drew on parallel models of divine punishment and eccle-
siastical discipline.
Id.
3. Professor Jerome Hall has emphasized the usefulness of history in understanding
the doctrine of criminal attempt, the subject of this Article, asserting also that "social and
psychological factors have had great influence upon the law of criminal attempt."
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 558 (2d ed. 1960).
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who argued, and the legislators who adopted the legal principles? Legal
historian Harold Berman has explained how the Western legal tradition
as a whole reflects the faith of Western Christendom.4 Might not that
faith also find expression in specific rules of law and their connection to.
moral principles?
This Article examines a difficult question of law and morality, a ques-
tion that is not lacking for scholarly comment. It has been favored by
remarks from Plato' and from Adam Smith.' It has been debated by
lawyers, legislators, historians, and moral philosophers What it has yet
to receive, however, is consideration explicitly from the aspect of the
Christian faith.8 This Article is a foray into that field.
I. A DIFFICULT QUESTION
Consider the following hypotheticals. Alexander, intending to kill
Carl, takes careful aim, fires, and inflicts a wound that proves instantly
fatal. Alexandra, intending to kill Carol, takes careful aim, fires, and in-
flicts the merest dent in Carol's bicycle. Alexander and Alexandra share
equal intention, skill, and equipment. But the wind unexpectedly blows
askant Alexandra's bullet, saving Carol's life. If both shooters suffer ar-
rest and conviction for their shots, Alexander likely will face the death
penalty or a long prison term, while Alexandra will receive a relatively
short prison term. A difference in wind has rendered Alexander guilty of
murder, Alexandra of attempted murder.
Whatever the theory of criminal law and punishment, these results ap-
pear anomalous, if not unjust. Both shooters harbored the same intent,
4. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION
OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
5. See infra note 110 (citing Plato's discussion of the connection between providence
and civil punishment).
6. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Adam Smith's statements on
the subject).
7. In a study of the diverse approaches to our question, a "problem [that] has con-
cerned and occupied generations of philosophers and jurists," one scholar confessed to
having nothing new to say and "no thoroughly satisfying resolution to the issue." Bj6rn
Burkhardt, Is There a Rational Justification for Punishing an Accomplished Crime More
Severely Than an Attempted Crime?, 1986 BYU L. REV. 553, 553. In his view, "hardly any
significant progress has been made in this area in the last two hundred years." Id.
8. Certainly, all commentators bring their religions to bear when considering such
questions, and many of these commentators likely are Christians. Yet, the difficult ques-
tion considered in this Article is so intractable as to yield fully only to an explicitly theo-
logical examination. The general Christian "capital" usually present in legal and moral
discussions within Christendom, and perhaps especially within the United States, has not
proved equal to the task.
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both indulged in the same conduct and both imposed the same risks.
Though the difference between the resultant loss of life and the dent in a
bicycle is of extreme importance to questions of compensation central to
tort law, why should this difference matter in criminal law at all? The
conduct to be deterred is identical for both actors. Both manifest equal
need for reform or incapacitation. Both seem to deserve equal punish-
ment for the wickedness of their intent and conduct. Can the wind really
matter so much?9 The criminal law of perhaps every jurisdiction in the
United States would treat Alexander and Alexandra very differently.1
9. Of course, this formulation of the question presupposes the importance of mens
rea in assessing criminality. That importance itself derives from Christian influence. See
GILLIS ERENIUS, CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND INDIVIDUALITY 30 (1976).
Even if this harsh rule [of liability for harmful acts simpliciter] prevailed in the
Anglo-Saxon codes, we may find a tendency to pay attention to the culpability of
the perpetrator. This was undoubtedly due to ecclesiastical influence. The
Church naturally looked primarily to the state of mind of the individual sinner.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations
on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 654-
55 (noting that Christian ethics influenced English criminal law to adopt the doctrine of
mens rea, a term first used by Saint Augustine to express the relations of act, will, and cul-
pability).
10. "Almost always, the penalty for an attempt to commit a capital crime or an of-
fense for which the penalty is life imprisonment is set at a specific term of years of impris-
onment." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 349 (2d ed. 1995)
(stating that attempted felonies receive lesser punishment than completed ones). Unlike
civil governments today, it seems that fourteenth-century England did punish attempted
murder with the death penalty as equivalent to murder as influenced by Roman and canon
law. See Albert Kiralfy, Taking the Will for the Deed: The Mediaeval Criminal Attempt, 13
J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 95 (1992). This practice revived later. See Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1524 (1974) ("During Coke's time, efforts were occasion-
ally made to punish unsuccessful attempts to kill as murder, but this approach was consid-
ered too severe and soon abandoned.").
Early American jurist James Wilson taught that
[t]he law of nature, it is admitted on all hands, measures crimes by the intentions,
and not by the event. Should a standard, different from that which has been es-
tablished by unerring wisdom, be adopted by uninformed man? Should not that
rule, which is observed by the law divine, by laws which are human? ... Is it not
shocking to reason ... and destructive of virtue, to contend, that the ill conse-
quence of an act is more to be considered than its immorality? ... The subtle dis-
tinctions, which casuists make between moral and political delinquencies, are of-
fensive to common sense.
Witte & Arthur, supra note 2, at 463 n.93 (quoting JAMES WILSON, LECTURES ON LAW
(1790-1792), in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 341, 343-44 (James D. Andrews ed.,
1896)).
Sir William Blackstone explained that attempt is punished less than the completed of-
fense in these words:
For evil, the nearer we approach it, is the more disagreeable and shocking; so
that it requires more obstinacy in wickedness to perpetrate an unlawful action,
1999]
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The problem our shooters raise is known in philosophical quarters as
the problem of moral luck," an oxymoronic label designed to carry the
weight of the philosophic analysis of the question. For how can the
moral quality of an act or an actor hinge upon luck?
Many commentators, accordingly, argue that the law errs in this mat-
ter. Attempts, and especially complete attempts like Alexandra's, in
which the actor has done all she thinks sufficient to commit the object of-
fense, generally should merit a punishment equal to the object offense
itself. 12
than barely to entertain the thought of it: and it is an encouragement to repen-
tance and remorse, even till the last stage of any crime, that it never is too late to
retract; and that if a man stops even here, it is better for him than if he proceeds:
for which reason an attempt to rob, to ravish, or to kill, is far less penal than the
actual robbery, rape, or murder.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *14. This reason would not obtain in cases of
completed attempts like Alexandra's. Would Blackstone therefore have held that she be
punished the same as Alexander?
11. See generally MORAL LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1993). "The phrase indeed
sounds strange." Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK, supra, at 35, 36. The
term is not unknown to courts of law. See Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 556 (1998) (discussing "moral luck"); United States v. Smith, 27
F.3d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (classifying consequences of criminal conduct as "moral
luck"); United States v. Martinez, 16 F.3d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the "moral
luck" of consequences pervades criminal law); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insula-
tors Local 17 Pension Fund v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756
(N.D. I11. 1998) (approving "moral luck principles"); United States v. Muntean, 870 F.
Supp. 261, 263 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (construing a statute to minimize "moral luck"); cf. United
States v. Tham, 118 F.3d 1501, 1507 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting from Martinez).
12. See, e.g., JEFFREY REIMAN, JUSTICE AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 190
(1990). Reiman explains that
[tihe lex talionis (and retributivism, generally) takes just punishment to be a
function of what people deserve, and what people deserve is a function of what is
in their control. Strictly speaking, the lex talionis calls for imposing on people
suffering equivalent to that which they have intentionally attempted to impose
on others, whether or not their attempts have, for reasons outside of their con-
trol, succeeded ....
Id.; cf WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 524 (2d ed. 1986)
(approving the provision of the Model Penal Code that punishes attempts "to the same
extent as the completed crime, except that a lower punishment is provided for attempts to
commit capital crimes or the most serious felonies," citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1)
(1985)). See generally Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 1 (1994) (contending that causing social harm, as opposed to the culpable risk of
harm, is irrelevant to retributive desert); Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the
Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725
(1988) (arguing that completed attempts generally deserve punishment equal to the analo-
gous completed offenses); Lawrence C. Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the
Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 262 (1974) (asserting that the social harm of criminal
attempts is commensurate to that of completed offenses and therefore deserving of com-
mensurate punishment); James J. Gobert, The Fortuity of Consequence, 4 CRIM. L.F. 1
(1993) (submitting that, in the punishment of attempt and other matters of the criminal
[Vol. 48:801
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Others defend the predominant legal status quo,13 asserting the need to
law, the fortuity of resulting harm should pale in significance before moral culpability re-
flected in acts and mental state); Richard Parker, Blame, Punishment and the Role of Re-
sult, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 269 (1984) (explaining that actual harm is irrelevant to criminal des-
ert, desert that properly should reflect the likelihood of harm instead); Schulhofer, supra
note 10 (stating that the moral culpability reflected in criminal law, including the law of
attempt, has nothing to do with the presence or absence of resulting harm); J.C. Smith,
The Element of Chance in Criminal Liability, 1971 CRIM. L. REV. 63 (approving the Eng-
lish rule that permits courts generally to punish attempts as severely as completed offenses
and thus to eliminate the influence of the chance that affects the occurrence of harm);
Kimberly D. Kessler, Comment, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 2183 (1994) (arguing that the criminal law should resist the influence of chance, and
especially the chance that distinguishes between attempt and completed offense).
13. Professor Sanford H. Kadish argues that the doctrine that would punish Alexan-
dra less than Alexander is "not rationally supportable notwithstanding its near universal
acceptance in Western law, the support of many jurists and philosophers, and its reso-
nance with the intuitions of lawyers and lay people alike." Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword:
The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679
(1994). He stops short, however, of arguing that the doctrine ought therefore to be aban-
doned, because he believes the doctrine is "ingrained in our moral sensibilities." Id. at
699. To abandon it as irrational would require that we first conclude that morality must be
rational, and that abandoning the doctrine would have no untoward effect on other moral
tenets.
In view of the worries and uncertainties . . . -ultimate doubts about the stan-
dards of validity by which to judge our moral beliefs, and the real possibility of
disturbing the patterns of our interconnected moral beliefs in unforeseeable and
dangerous ways-one would be well-advised to tread warily in forcing radical
changes in legal doctrine that too blatantly defy these popular beliefs ["in the
significance of harm and retribution"].
Id. at 701. Kadish's humility leads him to discard irrationality as a criticism of legal doc-
trine, at least in this instance. Cf. Michael D. Bayles, Punishment for Attempts, 8 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 19, 27 (1982) (finding none of the theoretical reasons sufficient to over-
turn the status quo of punishing attempts less than completed offenses).
Modern codifiers, including the drafters of the Model Penal Code, seem to use an ap-
proach similar to that of Professor Kadish. As Paul H. Robinson explains, modern codifi-
ers favor an emphasis on the subjective aspect of crime-the state of mind of actors-
rather than the common law favored objective aspect-the "resulting harm or evil." Paul
H. Robinson, The Role of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law: A Study in Legislative
Deception?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299, 300 (1994). Yet, the subjectivists temper
this inclination with objectivist elements, especially regarding grading. Objectivist
grading, that is, punishing actors more when evil results ensue, finds support in popular
morality. See id. at 305-07. Robinson finds that most modern jurisdictions, even if
subjectivist in part, retain "an objectivist view as to grading." Id. at 321. Further, he
concludes that,
[almong these jurisdictions that do claim a subjectivist view of grading, such as
the Model Penal Code, their codes are inconsistent and incomplete in imple-
menting the subjectivist view. But, while their treatment of harm and evil in
grading may seem seriously conflicted, the inconsistencies may well have been
carefully calculated. The drafters may have appreciated that their subjectivist
view of grading offenses does not match that of the community and that such a
deviation from the community's view of just punishment could undercut the ef-
fectiveness of the criminal law in gaining compliance. Although they are good
utilitarians, or perhaps because they are, subjectivist drafters generally produce
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accommodate differing levels of resentment, or the existence of uncer-
tainty that intent and conduct in attempts really are equivalent to those
of accomplished offenses." Some defenders have developed recondite
codes that appear to track community notions of deserved punishment, at least in
their most visible features.
Id. at 321-22 (footnote omitted).
14. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 129-31 (1968). Hart
explains that
[a] more difficult question concerns the almost universal practice of legal sys-
tems of fixing a more severe punishment for the completed crime than for the
mere attempt ....
The almost universal tendency in punishing to discriminate between attempts
and completed crimes rests, I think, on a version of the retributive theory which
has permeated certain branches of English law, and yet has on occasion been
stigmatized even by English judges as illogical. This is the simple theory that it is
a perfectly legitimate ground to grade punishments according to the amount of
harm actually done, whether this was intended or not; "if he has done the harm
he must pay for it, but if he has not done it he should pay less." To many people
such a theory of punishment seems to confuse punishment with compensation,
the amount of which should indeed be fixed in relation to harm done ....
My own belief is that this form of retributive theory appeals to something with
deeper instinctive roots than the ... principle [that a wrongdoer ought not to
profit from his wrong]. Certainly the resentment felt by a victim actually injured
is normally much greater than that felt by the intended [sic] victim who has es-
caped harm because an attempted crime has failed. Bishop Butler, in his sermon
on resentment explains on this ground the distinction men draw between "an in-
jury done" and one "which, though designed, was prevented, in cases where the
guilt is perhaps the same." But again the question arises, if this form of retribu-
tive theory depends on the connexion [sic] between blame and resentment,
whether the law should give effect to such a theory.
Id.
15. See, e.g., Gail L. Heriot, The Practical Role of Harm in the Criminal Law and the
Law of Tort, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 147-48 (1994) (arguing that harmful re-
sults do not affect moral desert, but do make us more certain that the offender deserves
punishment for putting another at risk of harm); Paul F. Rothstein, Causation in Torts,
Crimes, and Moral Philosophy: A Reply to Professor Thomson, 76 GEO. L.J. 151, 160
(1987) (arguing that consequences help us assess moral culpability by demonstrating the
probability of dangerousness).
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economic models," theories from social contract," or penal lotteries" to
justify the differential in punishment. Some have tried to show that
harmful results do in fact alter the moral situation, making the actor de-
serving of more punishment.'9 None of these efforts has proved success-
16. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal
Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 301 (1996) (suggesting
that punishing attempts less than complete offenses creates incentives for victims not to
overinvest in precautions); Samuel Kramer, Comment, An Economic Analysis of Criminal
Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 398, 414 (1990) (proposing a "parabolic scheme of sanctions" to present
appropriate incentives against crime from preparation through complete offense); Michael
Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Complete Crimes, 5 LAW & PHIL. 1,
12-13 (1986) (proposing the model of state auctions selling licenses to permit the otherwise
unfair advantage of committing attempts and complete offenses). Davis' theory is a target
of criticism in R.A. Duff, Auctions, Lotteries, and the Punishment of Attempts, 9 LAW &
PHIL. 1 (1990). Davis proposes answers to Duff in Chapter 10 of his book To Make the
Punishment Fit the Crime (1992).
17. See, e.g., Charles R. Carr, Punishing Attempts, 62 PAC. PHIL. Q. 61, 66 (1981) (ar-
guing that the social contract requires greater punishment for complete offenses than for
attempts in order to correct the greater imbalance cause by the former).
18. See David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 53, 58-59 (1989) (rationalizing the greater punishment for completed offenses
than for completed attempts by casting the practice as a penal lottery using harmful results
instead of straws to match the culpable risk of harm imposed by the actor). Lewis's theory
is a target of criticism in Duff's article, supra note 16, at 30.
19. See JACOB ADLER, THE URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE: A THEORY OF
PUNISHMENT 162, 165 (1991) (differentiating attempt from completed offense not on the
basis of pure desert, but on the basis of his "Rectification Principle" that assesses the "ex-
cess liberties arrogated by the offender"); DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 357 n.61 (arguing
that criminal penalties should be proportioned to the actual degradation of victims).
Dressier notes that "by attempting to commit an offense, a criminal sends the demean-
ing message to the victim that the wrongdoer's rights and interests are more valuable than
the victim's; however, by committing the offense, the victim or her property is actually de-
graded and her rights are diminished." Id. (citations omitted); see also HERBERT MORRIS,
ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 127 (1976) (advancing a distinction between blameworthiness
and guilt). Morris explains that
[t]he consummator owes more because he has taken and acquired more. He has
not just the satisfaction attendant upon relinquishing the burden of self-restraint,
but he has the satisfaction attendant upon realization of his desires [(i.e., violat-
ing another's rights)] .... He must then do something to reestablish the moral
equilibrium resting on mutual exercise of restraint and he must do something to
make amends for the particular harm to the individual.
Id.; see also Benjamin B. Sendor, Restorative Retributivism, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
323, 362 (1994) (asserting a moral difference between a claimed threat and an actualized
threat). Sendor explains that "an attempt represents an ineffective assertion of power and
an unsuccessful effort to demean. In comparison to a completed crime, an attempt is
merely a claim of power to control, merely a claim that the offender's interests have
greater value than the victim's right." Id.; see also Daniel M. Mandil, Note, Chance, Free-
dom, and Criminal Liability, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 125, 139 (1987) (arguing that criminal
liability hinges on the infringement of another's freedom). Mandil states:
1999]
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ful, however. Perhaps most find themselves in the hybrid position that
Adam Smith described in 1759:
To the intention or affection of the heart,.., to the propriety
or impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulness of the design,
all praise or blame, all approbation or disapprobation, of any
kind, which can justly be bestowed upon any action, must ulti-
mately belong.
When this maxim is thus proposed, in abstract and general
terms, there is nobody who does not agree to it. Its self-evident
justice is acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a dis-
senting voice among all mankind. Every body allows, that how
different soever the accidental, the unintended and unforeseen
consequences of different actions, yet, if the intentions or affec-
tions from which they arose were, on the one hand, equally
proper and equally beneficent, or, on the other, equally im-
proper and equally malevolent, the merit or demerit of the ac-
tions is still the same, and the agent is equally the suitable ob-
ject either of gratitude or of resentment.
But how well soever we may seem to be persuaded of the
truth of this equitable maxim, when we consider it after this
manner, in abstract, yet when we come to particular cases, the
actual consequences which happen to proceed from any action,
have a very great effect upon our sentiments concerning its
Imposing liability vindicates the legal interests that the intentional act offended.
Moreover, an infringement on the actor's freedom is justified because the act, in
causing harm, infringed another's freedom .... The chance absence of harm in
inchoate crimes appears to prevent the justified infringement on the actor's free-
dom, even though other social values require vindication.
Id. (One might ask whether, as the above excerpts may themselves suggest, these ration-
ales are not rather more suited to the compensatory function of tort than to the punitive
function of the criminal law.) See also Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability:
Decriminalizing Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1109 (1992) (arguing that
criminal law should punish according to the degree of imposition-including resulting
harm-the offender has placed upon others). Other theories suggest that resulting harm
provides an additional evil for which an actor is responsible. See generally Gregory Mel-
lema, On Risk Taking and Moral Responsibility, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1987,
at 3. But see generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, Morality and Bad Luck, in MORAL LUCK,
supra note 11, at 195 (distinguishing between blame for wrongs and blameworthiness of
the person). Another theory proposes that completed wrongful acts-such as those that
cause death-must be the primary moral focus of a deontological understanding of the
criminal law because alternatives fail. See Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 160 (1994). Still other theories contend that the educa-
tional, communicative function of the criminal law requires that completed offenses be
punished more severely than analogous attempts. See Duff, supra note 16, at 36; Morde-
chai Kremnitzer, Is There a Rational Justification for Punishing an Accomplished Crime
More Severely Than an Attempted Crime? A Comment on Prof. Dr. Bjorn Burkhardt's
Paper, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 81, 94 (1990).
[Vol. 48:801
Crime, Moral Luck, and the Sermon on the Mount
merit or demerit, and almost always either enhance or diminish
our sense of both. Scarce, in any one instance, perhaps, will our
sentiments be found, after examination, to be entirely regulated
by this rule, which we all acknowledge ought entirely to regu-
late them.20
II. KANT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS?
Thus Adam Smith describes with precision a tension in our moral sen-
timents." On the one hand, Alexander and Alexandra seem to deserve
equal punishment, and yet, on the other hand, they do not. 2 One would
surmise that these contrary sentiments spring from contrary sets of legal
or moral presuppositions. Ultimately, one would determine that con-
trary religious faiths must be competing for hegemony. Such, however, is
not the case.
Perhaps some resolution of this tension is suggested by Immanuel
23 24Kant." Kant, probably the preeminent modern philosopher, reasoned
that the will is the true and pure seat of moral quality. According to
Kant, "[niothing in the world-indeed nothing even beyond the world-
can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualifica-
tion except a good will. ''25 Therefore, the goodness or evil of what is
willed determines the goodness or evil of a human actor and the morality
of his act: "[I]n the estimation of the total worth of our actions it always
takes first place and is the condition of everything else. ''26 Consequences
20. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 93 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759); see also id. at 99-101 (applying the analysis
to criminal attempts specifically).
21. See id. at 104-05 (discussing the "[i]rregularity of sentiments" resulting from con-
sequences; noting that "the world judges by the event, and not by the design;" lamenting
the "great discouragement of virtue" (emphasis removed)).
22. See id. at 105 (noting that, although most agree that the "event"(result) should
not affect the evaluation, "when we come to particulars, we find that our sentiments are
scarce in any one instance exactly conformable to what this equitable maxim would di-
rect").
23. See Robert Paul Wolff, Introduction to KANT: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS at xx-
xxi (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1967) (asserting that the political writings of Immanuel Kant
present a unified and single approach to morality based on a "kingdom of ends").
24. See id. at ix. ("All philosophy before 1781 seems to flow into Kant's great system,
and little that has appeared since cannot be traced back to his influence. It has been truly
observed that in the modern world, one can philosophize against Kant or with him, but
never without him.").
25. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 9 (Lewis
White Beck trans., Liberal Arts Press 1959) (1785).
26. Id. at 13.
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of the act are irrelevant to this assessment; only the will matters." A fa-
mous passage explains:
The good will is not good because of what it effects or ac-
complishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some pro-
posed end; it is good only because of its willing, i.e., it is good of
itself. And, regarded for itself, it is to be esteemed incompara-
bly higher than anything which could be brought about by it in
favor of any inclination or even of the sum total of all inclina-
tions. Even if it should happen that, by a particularly unfortu-
nate fate or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature,
this will should be wholly lacking in power to accomplish its
purpose, and if even the greatest effort should not avail it to
achieve anything of its end, and if there remained only the good
will (not as a mere wish but as the summoning of all the means
in our power), it would sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as
something that had its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruit-
lessness can neither diminish nor augment this worth. Its use-
fulness would be only its setting, as it were, so as to enable us to
handle it more conveniently in commerce or to attract the at-
tention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to rec-
ommend it to those who are experts or to determine its worth. 8
If, for Kant, the will determines the goodness of a good act, the will also
should determine the evilness of an evil act. What the evil will actually
accomplish, or fails to accomplish, has no real bearing upon measuring
the morality of the act. 9
This view would seem to place Kant, retributivist as he was,30 firmly in
the camp of "equivalentists"-those who support equivalent punishment
for attempted and completed offenses.3 Because the will of the at-
tempter must be to accomplish the offense, and Kant held that the will
alone determines the morality of the act, equivalent punishment should
27. See id. at 10-11 (noting the "absolute worth of the will alone").
28. Id. at 10.
29. See id. (concluding that the "[ulsefulness" of a willed act cannot affect the value
of the will itself).
30. See, e.g., ALAN W. NORRIE, LAW, IDEOLOGY AND PUNISHMENT 61 (1991) (con-
cluding that for Kant "punishment was justified in terms only of" the "moral retributive
justification"); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 75 (1987) (asserting that
Kant "subscribe[s] to a very strong retributive theory which maintains that the voluntary
commission of a morally wrong act is both a necessary and sufficient condition of the legal
authority's duty to punish the offender" and explaining that "[o]n this view, punishment is
justified in the sense that it is required or obligatory").
31. See TEN, supra note 30, at 153-54 (discussing the principle of equivalence and
noting distinctions between equivalent and utilitarian approaches to punishment).
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follow.32 And yet, Kant plainly holds that Alexander and Alexandra
ought not to be punished in the same manner. Justice requires, instead,
that the murderer, but apparently not the attempter, suffer death.33 Kant
rejects utilitarian or other consequentialist rationales for criminal pun-
ishment. 4 No, Alexander deserves death; Alexandra deserves something
much less. How can one thinker of genius embrace simultaneously both
the equivalentist and nonequivalentist positions?
Kant's seemingly contradictory views on our difficult question do more
than demonstrate the truth of Adam Smith's observation. Each of
Kant's views finds a source deep within the Christian worldview.36 That
32. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 12, § 6.2(c), at 500-03 (discussing mental state
for attempt). Even regarding offenses that themselves require a mens rea less than pur-
pose, to be guilty of attempt one must purpose the conduct or result of that offense. See
id. at 501. In a sense, therefore, the will of the attempter may be required to be more evil
than that of the one who commits the object offense, but in any event, no less evil. See id.
33. See REIMAN, supra note 12, at 189. Reiman explains that
Kant . . . is a strict retributivist, who holds that people must receive harm
equivalent to what they have intentionally and unjustly inflicted: "Only the law
of retribution (jus talionis) can determine exactly the kind and degree of punish-
ment." Thus, if a man "has committed a murder, he must die." Moreover this
punishment is due even when there is no hope of deterring others: "Even if a civil
society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members ... , the
last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that everyone will
duly receive what his actions are worth."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE 101, 102 (Bob Merrill 1965) (1797)); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a The-
ory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 518-21, 530-32 (1987) (questioning the exis-
tence of a coherent Kantian theory of retributive justice and discussing, among other
things, Kant's use of the concept of bloodguilt and the concept of jus talionis to urge the
death penalty for murders).
34. See NORRIE, supra note 30, at 39-40 (asserting that retributive justice predomi-
nates Kant's writings and that utilitarian or consequentialist theories supply no aspect of
his justification for criminal punishment).
35. See Murphy, supra note 33, at 509, 531-32 (exploring this and other tensions Kant
presents in his discussions of ethics and punishment, and concluding that Kant presents no
coherent theory of punishment); see also NORRIE, supra note 30, at 54-55 (describing
Kant's theory as "built on tension" and containing an "element of schizophrenia"). Per-
haps Kant's thinking on this subject might seem less incoherent if taken in light of the pre-
sent Article. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining how the two theories
can coexist rationally).
36. Cf Judith Andre, Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK, supra note
11, at 123,125-27 (casting the Kantian view as inherently Christian in requiring a Supreme
Judge to dispense reward and punishment); Daniel Statman, Introduction, in MORAL
LUCK, supra note 11, at 1, 26 n.13. Statman notes that
if Protestantism did indeed have some real influence on Kant, as some commen-
tators believe, especially in its priority of 'faith' over 'works', to be expressed by
Kant in the priority of the good will over one's fortunate actions, then our con-
ception of morality being immune to luck might have some historical roots in re-
ligion after all.
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worldview, too, embraces simultaneously both the equivalentist and non-
equivalentist positions. Consequently, Kant is manifesting a consistently
Christian approach. But is that approach itself consistent?
Kant never harmonizes his divergent views on will and punishment,
nor does he explicitly discuss moral luck.37 It has fallen to later thinkers
to harmonize his views, or to accept one or the other, or some amalgam,
of these two apparently contrary positions. Yet, if Kant basically follows
Christian doctrine, why not consult that doctrine to solve the conun-
drum? If American legal and moral principles also embrace Christian
doctrine on this difficult question, might not that explain the popular-
ity-and possibly the soundness-of the position that finds Alexander
and Alexandra equally guilty morally, but unequally guilty criminally?
III. THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT
Two fundamental Christian doctrines support the view that simultane-
ously finds Alexandra as morally guilty as Alexander and yet not de-
serving of equal criminal punishment. Both doctrines are central to the
faith that largely shaped the laws and morals of America. Both find ex-
pression in the Sermon on the Mount.
The Sermon begins with the Beatitudes:
Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of
heaven. Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be com-
forted. Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness:
for they shall be filled. Blessed are the merciful: for they shall
obtain mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see
God. Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the
children of God. Blessed are they which are persecuted for
righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you,
and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake.
Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your reward in
heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before
38you.
In this passage, Jesus teaches that God responds graciously to those liv-
ing in the knowledge of their need of His grace. Blessing awaits those
who understand they deserve no blessing. Those blessed, in turn, be-
Id. (citation omitted).
37. See Statman, supra note 36, at 3-4 (discussing the concept of moral luck and em-
phasizing traditional objections to the concept as based in the Kantian theory of the "su-
preme value" of will).
38. Matthew 5:3-12.
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come a blessing themselves, and so receive still more blessing. Under-
stood in this way, the Christian life consists of receiving and mediating
God's blessings.
Subsumed within this teaching, however, are the two doctrines that
address our problem. These first words of the Sermon on the Mount
presage the two central doctrines that untangle the riddle of moral luck
as presented by the cases of Alexander and Alexandra. To understand
one's need of God's grace, one must understand one's moral fault. For
the Christian, it is moral fault that impoverishes, leaving us with no hope
to attain our purpose and happiness apart from God's help. A true un-
derstanding of our moral fault, however, requires a true understanding of
God's moral standards. The poor in spirit see their fault in comparison
with God's design and measure for the true and full human life. They
that mourn see the inestimable loss that humans experience in failing to
attain to God's design and measure for human life. The meek and those
who hunger and thirst for righteousness act in the knowledge of our loss
and of God's eagerness to forgive, restore, and heal.3 9 But all of these
people must know the appropriate measure of God's will for the fullness
of a human life. They must not confuse that measure with others. This
appreciation for the perfection of our ordained humanness is the core of
the first of the two doctrines that explain our apparent antinomy.
The core of the second doctrine also is suggested in the Beatitudes. Je-
sus teaches that the people he describes will be blessed and will receive
various graces and rewards. The poor in spirit become the truly rich;
mourners receive comfort; the meek, the hungry and thirsty, the others,
all receive their blessings. If true, this teaching entails a God whose will
is performed without fail, a loving God whose purposes always are exe-
cuted. This teaching embraces the second doctrine in the form of Divine
Providence, God's loving regulation of events according to His purpose.
As the remainder of the Sermon on the Mount expands upon the
themes of the Beatitudes, it is no surprise that the two doctrines-the
unique stringency of God's standard for "perfect humanness," and the
beneficent omnipotence of God's Divine Providence-find more com-
plete expression in the verses that follow.
The first doctrine occupies the better part of the fifth chapter of the
Gospel according to Saint Matthew:
Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets:
39. See id. at 5:5-6. Those receiving this forgiveness, restoration, and healing become
pure in heart, peacemakers, and, though persecuted for righteousness' and Christ's sake,
will attain the Kingdom of Heaven. See id. at 5:8-10.
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I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil [sic]. For verily I say unto
you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no
wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. Whosoever therefore
shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach
men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven:
but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called
great in the kingdom of heaven. For I say unto you, That ex-
cept your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the
scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom
of heaven. Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time,
Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger
of the judgment: But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry
with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judg-
ment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in
danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall
be in danger of hell fire."
Jesus continues, warning that "[y]e have heard that it was said by them of
old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery: But I say unto you, That who-
soever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery
with her already in his heart.",
4
1
God's standard for "perfect humanness" and its strictures occupy more
of the sermon:
It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him
give her a writing of divorcement: But I say unto you, That
whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of forni-
cation, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall
marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.
Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old
time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto
the Lord thine oaths: But I say unto you, Swear not at all; nei-
ther by heaven; for it is God's throne: Nor by the earth; for it is
his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great
King. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst
not make one hair white or black. But let your communication
be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these
cometh of evil.
Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and
a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil:
but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him
the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and
40. Id. at 5:17-22.
41. Id. at 5:27-28.
[Vol. 48:801
Crime, Moral Luck, and the Sermon on the Mount
take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever
shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him
that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn
not thou away.
Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy
neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love
your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that
hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and
persecute you; That ye may be the children of your Father
which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and
on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. For
if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not
even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren
only, what do ye more than others? do not even the publicans
so? Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in
42heaven is perfect.
The import of these verses is to demonstrate the gap between the civil
law and the moral law for humankind. Jesus does not criticize the law of
the Torah, much less replace it. Everything he teaches was implicit in the
Torah, as his listeners must have realized. What is especially striking in
the passage, however, is the repeated and insistent call not to find moral
justification in adherence to a civil law standard of behavior. One may
not be committing murder, and yet hate; one may not be committing the
act of adultery, and yet commit adultery in one's heart. Again, it is not
that the civil law itself is defective-God himself ordained the civil law in
this case.43 Rather, Jesus warns of the confusion of the types of law, and
of the appropriate forum-the judgment of goodness before men and the
judgment of goodness before God." Even God's rules for social govern-
ance do not establish perfect rules for human behavior, though, of
course, they do plainly suggest them.
The Sermon on the Mount also expatiates on the theme of Divine
Providence suggested in the Beatitudes:
Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy
42. Id. at 5:31-48.
43. It may be that God Himself adheres to something like a lex talionis even in met-
ing out his own justice. See Abraham Cronbach, "Manner for Manner" in Dante, 35
HEBREW UNION C. ANN. 193, 193 (1964) (discussing the notion that divine punishments
and rewards are shaped according to the corresponding human acts).
44. Dean Herbert W. Titus has explained regarding the Sermon on the Mount that
"[t]he mistake that the scribes and Pharisees had made was that if man was right before
Israel's rulers, he was then right before God. It was a mistake of jurisdiction." HERBERT
W. TITUS, GOD, MAN, AND LAW: THE BIBLICAL PRINCIPLES 71 (1994). Much of this
Article was inspired by the work of Dean Titus.
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neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love
your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that
hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and
persecute you; That ye may be the children of your Father
which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and
on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."
The encompassing regulation of Divine Providence is reflected further
in the teaching on alms:
Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen
of them: otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in
heaven. Therefore when thou doest thine alms, do not sound a
trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and
in the streets, that they may have glory of men. Verily I say
unto you, They have their reward. But when thou doest alms,
let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth: That thine
alms may be in secret: and thy Father which seeth in secret him-
self shall reward thee openly.
And when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites
are: for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the
corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men. Verily I
say unto you, They have their reward. But thou, when thou
prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door,
pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth
in secret shall reward thee openly.
4 6
The passage, and the reference to Divine Providence, continue:
Moreover when ye fast, be not, as the hypocrites, of a sad
countenance: for they disfigure their faces, that they may ap-
pear unto men to fast. Verily I say unto you, They have their
reward. But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thine head, and
wash thy face; That thou appear not unto men to fast, but unto
thy Father which is in secret: and thy Father, which seeth in se-
cret, shall reward thee openly.47
Divine Providence secures the complete fulfillment of every human
need. The passage explains:
Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life, what
ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what
ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body
than raiment? Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not,
neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly
45. Matthew 5:43-45.
46. Id. at 6:1-6.
47. Id. at 6:16-18.
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Father feedeth them: Are ye not much better than they?
Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stat-
ure? And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies
of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin:
And yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was
not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the
grass of the field, which to day is, and to morrow is cast into the
oven, shall he not much more clothe you, 0 ye of little faith?4
The passage proclaims that God governs the world. He regulates na-
ture and also shapes the consequences of human acts. This truth is ever
to be before us as we live out our lives. We are to behave as those who
know that God rules, and that it is not ultimately we who establish the
outcome of our conduct, but He.
IV. NEITHER MORAL NOR LUCK
This Article aspires to flesh out these two doctrines from the Sermon
on the Mount. The whole of Holy Writ bears witness to a divergence be-
tween social standards of human conduct and the absolute standard of
human perfection. So too does it bear witness to God's Providence.
Some of this teaching receives attention later in this Article. But before
embarking further, the connection between the doctrines found in the
Sermon on the Mount and our cases of the murdering Alexander and the
bicycle-denting Alexandra will be established.
First, the most just and perfect law for social use-for example, civil or
church law-does not prescribe the total justice and perfection of ideal
human behavior. Recognition of this principle does not necessarily en-
tail the notion of inner-morality versus outer-legality, or the idea that law
for society is instrumental and consequentialist while private morality is
deontological, or some other such dichotomy. Rather, the principle may
entail the Christian view that all authority comes from God, and that
human authorities have various roles or ministries in recognizing,
adopting, and applying law. The nature and purpose of law may not
change from forum to forum, but the authority of a forum does. Justice
remains a universal standard of law, no matter the forum, but no sublu-
nary forum has commission to do total, absolute justice. That power is
God's alone.
So the moral luck that seems to damn Alexander's act more than Al-
exandra's because the wind shapes the trajectory of bullets is not really
moral luck at all. If, before God, their hearts, acts, or characters are
48. Id. at 6:25-30.
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equally guilty, He will judge. But our human response, including the re-
sponse of our laws, may with justice treat them as guilty of different of-
fenses to be punished differently. Leaving absolute justice to God, a
Christian approach understands that the human role in responding to
these acts is limited. The luck is not moral, but "jurisdictional."
The Christian approach also, however, would not recognize moral luck
as luck. If it were only luck that assigned the deadly aspect of Alexan-
der's act both to God and to a jurisdiction ready to send him to death for
it, and the deadly aspect of Alexandra's act to God alone, the justice of
the jurisdictional rule might be questioned. After all, as far as human
law is concerned, we are treating possibly equally evil acts unequally.
49
The jurisdictional understanding of moral luck proves too much if the ju-
risdictional rules are themselves arbitrary. Then God's justice becomes a
human justice slush fund, licensing human authorities to do sporadic,
partial justice, unjustly.
One factor that prevents this degeneration of a jurisdictional principle
into a prescription for human injustice is the principled nature of the ju-
risdictional rule, a rule that itself is just. The other, and perhaps even
more important factor when it comes to specific cases, is Divine Provi-
dence. That the possibly equally evil acts of Alexander and Alexandra
deserve such unequal human responses is due to the wind that itself is
under God's providential power. A Christian worldview understands
that how the wind moves, in fact, how the world holds together at all, de-
pends upon God's will. (It also understands, however, that Alexander,
not God, murdered Carl.) God arrays the platform upon which human
acts are performed. It is not luck, therefore, but Providence, that assigns
cases to various fora, where God's justice may be administered in part
according to jurisdictional rules that are themselves expressions of God's
justice.
It appears, then, that a Christian view typified by the Sermon on the
Mount may make sense of the moral luck conundrum. This view explains
how we see Alexander and Alexandra as perhaps equally guilty in one
sense, and yet not equally guilty in another, without compromising on
standards of justice in either estimation. Before God and His absolute
and complete standards of human moral perfection, Alexandra may be
as guilty as Alexander. Before fellow humans in state, church, and other
social contexts, and the limited authority they possess to accomplish lim-
ited justice as cases providentially come before them, Alexander may be
49. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text (discussing rationales for treating
attempts differently from completed crimes, though the underlying act appears to be the
same).
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guiltier than Alexandra.
V. EVEN GOD'S CIVIL LAW HAS ITS LIMITS
A fundamental tenet of the Christian faith holds that in God reposes
all authority.0 Humans exercise authority only derivatively and within
limits. Humans exercising the authority of civil government exercise
only the authority that God allots to that ministry.
The biblical locus classicus on the authority of civil government ex-
plains the principle:
[R]ulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt
thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good,
and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister of
God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be
afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minis-
ter of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth
evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath,
but also for conscience sake. For for [sic] this cause pay ye trib-
ute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually
upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: tribute
to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom
fear; honour to whom honour.
51
Civil rulers, as ministers of God, are to punish evil acts. There is no men-
tion here of judging character, thought, or pure will. God Himself does
that,52 although humans do this to some degree, when disciplining chil-
dren, or members of a church,53 or in selecting persons for tasks or roles.
50. See Romans 13:1-2 ("Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there
is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore
resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to
themselves damnation.").
51. Id. at 13:3-7; see also 1 Peter 2:13-14 (commanding Christians to "[s]ubmit [them-
selves] to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as su-
preme; Or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-
doers, and for the praise of them that do well.").
52. See 1 Samuel 16:7 (teaching that "the LORD said unto Samuel, Look not on his
countenance, or on the height of his stature: because I have refused him: for the LORD
seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward apperance, but the LORD looketh
on the heart").
53. In the early medieval church, documents assisted confessors in the then-novel
practice of private confession of sin and penance. See generally MEDIEVAL HANDBOOKS
OF PENANCE (John T. McNeill & Helena M. Garner trans., 1990) (translating these docu-
ments). These handbooks, which worked in tandem with civil folklaw, see BERMAN, supra
note 4, at 68-76 (discussing the development of penitential law and its effect on and inter-
relationship with civil folklaw), listed penances to be prescribed for all manner of sins, in-
cluding evil thoughts and desires. See MEDIEVAL HANDBOOKS OF PENANCE, supra, at
88, 90, 92, 104, 108, 185-86, 303, 368.
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The civil government, however, though it may ascertain character in fill-
ing its offices, may not punish faulty character. Its role is to punish
wicked acts.
But not all sinful acts are civil crimes, even in God's civil law for Is-
rael.55 Some sinful acts, even harmful sinful acts, were for God alone to
judge and punish." Similarly, not every criminal act within the cogni-
zance of civil government was to be punished. Some criminal acts would
escape detection. Furthermore, unless two or three witnesses could rise
to testify in court, the crime was to go unpunished by civil government.57
All evil acts were to come before God, however, either before God Him-
self or before God and His ministers of justice in civil government." The
touchstone of civil authority does not seem to be the heinousness, harm-
fulness, or any other measure of the moment of the offense; 9 rather,
54. See 1 Peter 2:14 (admonishing Christians to obey civil governments sent by God
"for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well").
55. See Roger Bern, A Biblical Model for Analysis of Issues of Law and Public Pol-
icy: With Illustrative Application to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies and Public Policy Issues,
6 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 116-24 (1995) (discussing jurisdictional considerations applica-
ble in applying biblical principles: "[Niot every sin is within the jurisdiction of Civil Gov-
ernment."). One should note that the instant Article draws upon the whole of the Bible to
explore the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount pertinent to cases like Alexander's and
Alexandra's. Like the Sermon itself, the entire Bible has profoundly influenced our mor-
als and jurisprudence. For many, it remains a source of truth in these areas. To be sure,
the Bible deserves careful exegesis. But this author vehemently disagrees with the claim
that "[any attempts to apply the principles of the Torah to the American legal system are
incoherent and unjustified." Daniel A. Rudolph, The Misguided Reliance in American
Jurisprudence on Jewish Law to Support the Moral Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 33
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 437, 462 (1996).
56. See Craig A. Stern, Things Not Nice: An Essay on Civil Government, 8 REGENT
U. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1997) (relying especially upon Leviticus 18 and 20 to explain the limits
of civil authority).
57. See Numbers 35:30 (imposing the requirement of more than one witness to im-
pose a death sentence); Deuteronomy 17:6 (same), 19:15 (same, except apparently ex-
tended beyond capital cases).
58. See 2 RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 13 (E. P.
Dutton 1968) (1597) (enjoining those employed in "the public administration of justice" to
be "in heart persuaded that justice is God's own work, and themselves his agents in this
business, the sentence of right God's own verdict, and themselves his priests to deliver it"
(footnote omitted)).
59. Failing to appreciate that the distinction between cases like Alexander's and Al-
exandra's is actually jurisdictional has introduced much confusion. It has driven commen-
tators to search for a reason to hold Alexander's crime to be worse than Alexandra's, and
so deserving of more punishment absolutely. That is a very difficult chore. Professor Joel
Feinberg, after answering arguments some have made in support of the moral desert of
greater punishment for greater actual harm, concluded,
when we looked at some arguments for retention [of the traditional rule that "at-
taches more significance to the amount of actual harm caused than to the blame-
worthiness of the actor"] we discovered that none of them claim that the princi-
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some other distinction is at work. Sometimes, it is obvious. The re-
quirement of two or three witnesses seems designed to foster the reli-
ability of civil judgments. Other distinctions are less perspicuous, like
that between the civilly punishable and unpunishable offenses in Leviti-
cus 20,60 indicating that even the theocracy of Israel was to be modest in
its jurisdiction. As seen in Scripture, God designed a disjunction be-
tween Israel's jurisdiction and His, between civil law and the total law of
human behavior.61
Certainly the Lord God is at liberty, according to His loving righteous-
pie of proportionality is wrong in giving such an important role to moral blame-
worthiness. In fact, they all endorse the principle of proportionality but then go
on to argue that the blameworthiness that punitive seve'rity is to be proportionate
to is determined by something else, namely the amount of actual harm produced
by the offender's contribution in combination with the contribution of parts of
the natural world over which the offender had little normal control. Giving good
reasons for that proposition-that moral blameworthiness is itself grounded in
actual harm caused-is such a heavy burden that it is no wonder the arguments
we examined were so bad.
Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Arguments
Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 131 (1995).
60. See Leviticus 20:1-27 (setting forth the punishment for the moral offenses listed in
Leviticus 18). Some punishments were for Israel to exact, some for God alone. The rab-
bis, however, did not understand this chapter to preclude Israel also from punishing the
offenses to be punished by God Himself. Rather, the rabbis read Deuteronomy 25:1-3, a
passage regarding judicial beating for "the wicked man ... worthy to be beaten ... ac-
cording to his fault," as authorizing beatings for such offenses. See 11 THE JEWISH
ENCYCLOPEDIA 569 (Isidore Singer ed., 1905) (noting this use of beatings, and referenc-
ing Deuteronomy 25:2-3 as authority). This rabbinic understanding does not entail that
these offenses are to be punished by a civil government other than Israel. Beating may be
more in the nature of fatherly discipline entrusted to judges in Israel than in the nature of
the punishment entrusted to the state in such passages as Romans 13:1-6 (describing the
civil government's power as derived from God). See, e.g., Proverbs 13:24 ("He that spa-
reth the rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes."); 19:29
("Judgments are prepared for scorners, and stripes for the back of fools."); 20:30 ("The
blueness of a wound cleanseth away evil: so do stripes the inward parts of the belly.");
22:15 ("Foolishness is bound in the heart of a child; but the rod of correction shall drive it
far from him."); 23:13-14 ("Withhold not correction from the child: for if thou beatest him
with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and shalt deliver his soul
from hell."). For a study that explores the distinction between penal and educational con-
texts for common beliefs on the significance of harmful results, see Yoram Shachar, The
Fortuitous Gap in Law and Morality, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1987, at 12.
61. See BERNARD S. JACKSON, Liability for Mere Intention in Early Jewish Law, in
ESSAYS IN JEWISH AND COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY 202 (1975). Jackson stated:
[I]t is valid to draw two conclusions from the biblical [i.e., Old Testament] texts.
First, there is no evidence that liability for mere intention was ever applied in a
human court. Second, and equally significant, the idea did exist that merely to
intend a wrong was itself wrong. It was a principle employed in God's justice,
but not, at this period, in the jurisprudence of man.
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ness, to apportion offenses to civil jurisdiction or not. But His doing so is
no justification for our doing so, unless we follow His pattern or some
other just method. Does the Scripture, then, teach that results call for
heightened civil punishment?6' A complication in answering this impor-
tant question derives from the nature of the biblical law involving wrongs
that entail results.
Many wrongs to be punished by Israel are defined with respect to acts.
Those listed in Leviticus 20, for example, describe various acts that are to
be punished." Such offenses, though useful in discerning generally the
role of civil government, are not helpful in assessing the role of result as
a signal for a response by the civil jurisdiction. When result does figure
in biblical wrongs, however, the wrongs seem really more delictual than
criminal; they are a combination of what we define as tort and crime.
Because tort generally is concerned largely with the harm done to vic-
tims-often results of tortious acts-result plainly should figure promi-
nently in determining the response of civil government. Passages like
those from Exodus 21 that treat acts causing death differently from the
same acts that cause lesser harm may not really support the use of results
as a license for greater civil government response in the criminal law.
6
4
62. As to the moral significance of results, St. Thomas Aquinas held that the actual,
as opposed to the forseeable, results of acts do not themselves "add to the moral good or
evil of the outward action." 18 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: PRICIPLES
OF MORALITY 99 (la2ae. 20, 5) (Blackfriars 1966) (1267-73). Aquinas viewed something
like the wind in Alexandra's case in this manner: "[I]f the result follows haphazardly and
rarely, then it does not affect the morality of the act for better or for worse, for you do not
pass judgment on matters by what is incidental to them, but by what they essentially im-
ply." Id. at 101. Likewise, Bishop Joseph Butler, "according to Cardinal Newman 'the
greatest name in the Anglican Church' and the author of the most famous volume of Eng-
lish theology," Ronald Bayne, Introduction to JOSEPH BUTLER, THE ANALOGY OF
RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED at vii (J.M. Dent 1906) (1736), considered the
question:
[W]ill and design... constitute the very nature of actions as such .... [T]hey are
the object, and the only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty. Acting,
conduct, behaviour, abstracted from all regard to what is in fact and event the
consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral discernment .... Inten-
tion of such and such consequences, indeed, is always included; for it is part of
the action itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not fol-
low, we have exactly the same sense of the action as if they did.
Id. at 265.
63. See Leviticus 20:1-27 (listing wrongful acts, some of which Israel was to punish).
64. See also Exodus 21:23 ("[A]nd if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for
life...."); id. at 21:28-29:
If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned,
and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit. But if the
ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to his
owner, and he hath not kept him in, but that he hath killed a man or a woman;
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Rather, these statutes and judgments may teach compensation for re-
sulting harm when a victim survives to be compensated, and the death
penalty for certain fatal results when bloodguilt remains instead of a live
victim.
There is, however, one biblical wrong that both appears more criminal
than delictual and also speaks to the issue of results and, perhaps, at-
tempt. This wrong, false testimony, is the subject of Deuteronomy 19:16-
21:
If a false witness rise up against any man to testify against
him that which is wrong; Then both the men, between whom the
controversy is, shall stand before the LORD, before the priests
and the judges, which shall be in those days; And the judges
shall make diligent inquisition: and, behold, if the witness be a
false witness, and hath testified falsely against his brother; Then
shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to have done unto his
brother: so shalt thou put the evil away from among you. And
those which remain shall hear, and fear, and shall henceforth
commit no more any such evil among you. And thine eye shall
not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,
hand for hand, foot for foot.
65
One could view this offense as an attempt. By false testimony, the lying
witness intends to use the court to inflict injury on his opponent. Seen
this way, results matter not, for the offense has no requirement that the
injury actually occur. The judgment against the false witness is for what-
ever "he had thought to have done unto his brother," according to the lex
talionis.66 Perhaps, then, civil government ought not to treat harmful re-
sults as deserving greater punishment. If so, Alexander and Alexandra
67would receive equal sentences.
the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.
Compare Exodus 21:18-19:
And if men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist,
and he die not, but keepeth his bed: If he rise again, and walk abroad upon his
staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his
time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.
with id. at 21:12 ("He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death.")
65. Deuteronomy 19:16-21.
66. Id. 19:19. Lex talionis is the law embodied in the expression "an eye for an eye."
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 913 (6th ed. 1990).
67. Professor Vern S. Poythress has drawn this conclusion:
What should we say about cases of attempted murder? The Mosaic law does
not speak directly concerning the penalty for attempted murder, perhaps because
it is difficult in many cases for judges to determine that a particular crime is at-
tempted murder in distinction from attempt to cause serious injury (Exodus
21:18-9, 23-5). This case is therefore more doubtful in character. Deuteronomy
19:16-21 seems to indicate that the intention to do a thing, if legally demonstra-
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The difficulty with this reading, however, is that, under it, Alexander
and Alexandra would both be sentenced to death. Yet this action plainly
would contradict Exodus 21. There, the nonfatal and fatal smitings were
assigned very different judgments. Likewise, the lex talionis of Deuter-
onomy 19 seems to contradict that of Exodus 21. The former grades
wrongs according to intent, the latter according to result. To harmonize
these passages, the false witness statute must be understood to punish
perjury specifically and not attempt generally. The abuse of the courts is
the wrong, and it is complete in the giving of false testimony. Thus, the
irrelevance of results and the severity of the judgments obtain irrespec-
tive of the impact on the target of the perjurer's testimony. The death
penalty-if, as is likely, composition was not to be allowed here-would
indicate the holiness of the administration of God's justice among His
holy people, Israel. This statute, then, is of no help in assessing the rele-
vance of results as a measure of the scope of the just response of civil
government in criminal cases like those of Alexander and Alexandra.
While not answering our question regarding results, the Sermon on the
Mount does teach that the law for civil government is not to be confused
with the law of human behavior generally. The law of human behavior
generally is stricter and more complete. 6' And the penalties for breach of
that law are also more severe, including consignment to hell itself.6 9
Rather than a statement of morality pure and simple, civil law instead is
a statement of morality committed to the civil authority that administers
only a portion of God's righteous wrath. Civil law, then, reflects both
morality and jurisdictional concerns, even in a system of retributive
criminal law. For the civil law to be just, both the morality and the juris-
dictional principle must be just. What is not necessary, however, is that
the jurisdictional principles themselves reflect absolute desert.70
There appear to be no biblical texts proving that results are a just
touchstone for the exercise of greater punitive civil authority. Never-
theless, two related general biblical principles support the conclusion that
ble, constitutes guilt on the same level as the actual doing of it. On this basis I
deduce that attempted murder deserves the death penalty. As I have already ob-
served, in this and other cases the maximum penalty is to be enforced only when
(a) the crime is legally demonstrable beyond reasonable doubt; (b) there are no
mitigating circumstances.
VERN S. POYTHRESS, THE SHADOW OF CHRIST IN THE LAW OF MOSES 172 (1991); see
also Leviticus 24:19-20 (prescribing the lex talionis for actually causing a blemish).
68. See Matthew 5:28 (stating that one commits adultery under God's law merely by
"lust" in his heart, as opposed to human law, which requires the overt act).
69. See id. at 5:27-30.
70. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional limitations
on civil law).
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Alexander deserves more civil punishment than Alexandra. First, God
has placed humans within a moral setting where results have moral con-
sequences." Alexandra's act may be as evil as Alexander's, but the Bible
would hold Alexander guilty of bloodguilt. Unlike tortious harm to a
surviving victim, bloodguilt for an actual murder placed special responsi-
bility upon Israel to do justice in executing the murderer. 2 The murder
itself was understood to have a special moral aspect that required a civil
response beyond that of an equally intended murderous smiting that
failed to cause a death. Likewise, the Decalogue commands "Thou shalt
not kill."7 3 It is the murdering itself that is the complete wrong. To in-
tend and act to cause murder, though possibly as heinous an evil as to in-
tend and accomplish a murder, is in some respect a derivative evil. It is
the murder that epitomizes the wrong, for humans at least, as we admin-
ister justice as God's viceregents in civil government.
Perhaps another aspect of this first principle lies in understanding the
law as an evaluative as well as an imperative norm. "Thou shalt not kill"
strikes us most as an imperative, commanding us not to murder. When
71. See Duff, supra note 16, at 34-36 (arguing that by consequent harm an offender
"[brings] evil into the world"); George P. Fletcher, What is Punishment Imposed For?, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101, 102-04 (1994) (suggesting that seeing punishment as a
remedy for wrong supports taking harmful results into account); Michael S. Moore, The
Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 237
(1994) (arguing that our sense of justice and the illogic of the argument from moral luck
demonstrate that resulting harm from criminal conduct deserves extra punishment). But
see, e.g., supra note 13 (opposing arguments that resulting harm has significance for re-
tributive desert).
72. See Numbers 35:31-34. Here, God issues a categorical command:
Moreover ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer, which is guilty
of death: but he shall be surely put to death. And ye shall take no satisfaction for
him that is fled to the city of his refuge, that he should come again to dwell in the
land, until the death of the priest. So ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are:
for blood it defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is
shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it. Defile not therefore the land
which ye shall inhabit, wherein I dwell: for I the LORD dwell among the children
of Israel.
Id.
One would think that a commitment to the death penalty for murder would put a swift
end to our problem, at least for cases like Alexander's and Alexandra's. Few would advo-
cate the death penalty for any attempted murder. But see supra note 10 (discussing the
sporadic medieval and 17th century practice in England of putting people to death for at-
tempted murder). Presumably, the equivalentist would set the penalty for murder and at-
tempted murder (or some new offense of deadly endangerment?) at some high, but non-
capital level. See Kessler, supra note 12, at 2228-37 (discussing equivalentist options for
punishment).
73. Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. "Kill" would be rendered "murder" in more
contemporary English. Compare the translation of the New International Version: "You
shall not murder." Exodus 20:13 (N.I.V.); Deuteronomy 5:17 (N.I.V.).
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confronting a corpse and a murder, however, the commandment offers
itself as a measure to assess the situation, and the deserts of the mur-
derer. Results seem to call for their own response from civil government:
Those who one-sidedly ascribe importance to the imperative
norm overlook vitally important functions of criminal law-af-
firmation of the validity of the violated law, stabilization of be-
havioral expectations, reparation, prevention of persons taking
the law into their own hands, etc. These functions do not
emerge until after the breach of the norm. The law is not
merely a means of prevention, but also-and perhaps primar-
ily-an instrument for settlement of already existing social con-
flict. Under this view, social consequences of crime are deci-
sive.74
While not altering the moral estimation of an offense according to strict
retributive justice, results may prompt an enhanced retributive response
from civil government as the human agency to evaluate criminal harm.
Similarly, a second principle supports the significance of results for
civil penal jurisdiction. Though biblical criminal law requires human
judges-or at least the "congregations" of the Cities of Refuge-to dis-
cern mens rea (e.g., the difference between a "smite" with "enmity" and
a "thrust" "without enmity"),75 the Bible also cautions that our abilities
to perceive and act upon truth are limited. Presumably, the limited na-
ture of civil jurisdiction itself reflects this fact.76 God calls us to do justice
in small measure-justice to be sure, but only in part. Results are signifi-
cant for the civil jurisdiction because they clarify and help prove the evil
of the intention and the act, not only for judge and jury, but also for
criminal and community. Just as canonists and theologians value exter-
nal acts not purely in themselves so much as for revelation of intentions,"
74. Burkhardt, supra note 7, at 561 (footnotes omitted). Presumably, the use of law
as an evaluative norm does not demand the utilitarian cast it receives here.
75. See Numbers 35:14-25 (elaborating the law of homicide).
76. See Bern, supra note 55, at 161-65 (arguing that biblical principles put unmeas-
urable damages-those for physical or emotional pain and suffering-beyond the scope of
civil government); cf. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, The Birth-mark in, THE CENTENARY
EDITION OF THE WORKS OF NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE 36-56 (Ohio State Univ. Press
1974) (1843) (telling a tale of the fatal consequences of one man's attempt to perfect his
beloved).
77. The Church of the early middle ages seems to have prescribed more onerous
penances for acts than for the simple sinful desire or intention to perform the acts. See
MEDIEVAL HANDBOOKS OF PENANCE, supra note 53, passim. The Penitential of Finnian
(Irish, ca. 525-50) explained:
If anyone has thought evil and intended to do it, but opportunity has failed
him, it is the same sin but not the same penalty; for example, if he intended forni-
cation or murder, since the deed did not complete the intention he has, to be
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sure, sinned in his heart, but if he quickly does penance, he can be helped. This
penance of his is half a year on an allowance, and he shall abstain from wine and
meats for a whole year.
Id. at 88. It would seem from this excerpt that actions were seen as completions of inten-
tions, perhaps viewing intention as a state embracing various aspects (including acts) until
the intended goal was attained. Quick penance interrupts the intention, cutting the ill will
short. The sin is the same, but the intensity and duration differ.
Five centuries later, Western Christendom saw a "profound alteration" in the concepts
regarding individuals, an alteration that led to a deepened emphasis on "a person's inner
state-his feelings, his motives, his reasoning capacity, and his sense of the moral." Law-
rence Rosen, Intentionality and the Concept of the Person, in, 27 CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
NOMOS 61 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985). Peter Abelard was the
most extreme exponent of this emphasis, denying totally the moral significance of action.
See id. at 62. He stated emphatically that
"the addition of the performance of the deed adds nothing to increase the sin,"
[and said] that in good acts as well as bad everything is determined by our inten-
tion and consent: "It does not in fact matter to merit whether you give alms to
the needy; charity may make you ready to give and the will may be there when
the opportunity is missing and you no longer remain able to do so .... "
ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, MORAL ACTION 211 (1985) (quoting Peter Abelard; internal cita-
tions omitted). For Abelard, there is no essential connection at all between act and mo-
rality, so human judgment must be pragmatic and not based upon moral desert. See id. at
212. Only a presumption of sinfulness might arise from acts. See BERMAN, supra note 4,
at 189. Berman goes on to explain:
Abelard's view that sinfulness may be presumed and only presumed, and
therefore ignored, was rejected by the church. The canon lawyers [in the decades
after Abelard] were concerned above all with measuring the offense against God.
They saw the "external indicators" as God-given devices for that purpose, but
they also went beyond them to a specific inquiry into the mind and heart and soul
of the accused. They recognized that ecclesiastical law is applied in the earthly
forum of the church, not in the heavenly forum, and that therefore it must pro-
ceed according to the criteria of objectivity and generality; nevertheless, they saw
no essential conflict but rather a basic harmony between those criteria and the
criteria of divine justice. Following their conceptions of God's own procedures,
they were interested to determine both whether the accused intentionally com-
mitted a morally and socially offensive act in violation of a law and to what ex-
tent he thereby revealed a depraved mind and heart and soul.
Id. (footnote omitted). Within decades of these canonists, St. Thomas Aquinas would ex-
plain:
If we are speaking of the goodness the outward deed gets from the act of will in-
tending the end, then nothing is gained from its exteriorization, unless it means in
effect that the act of will becomes better with good, or, as the case may be, worse
with evil. This can come about in three ways. First, by number; for example,
when a man wills a deed for a good or bad end, but at the time does not carry it
out, and then afterwards, when he both intends and performs the deed, his act of
will is doubled, and so too is its goodness or badness. Second, by extent; for ex-
ample, one man may will to do something for a good or bad purpose and then
stop short because of some obstacle, whereas another will press on until he has
done it, so manifesting a more prolonged act of will for good or ill, and this ac-
cordingly is better or worse. Third, by intensity; because they are irksome or
pleasurable some outward acts are such as to call for a greater or lesser effort of
will. Clearly the more strongly the will is set on some good or evil so much the
better or worse it is.
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so results certify the deadliness of intent and act for us. 8
These two principles help explain the tension described by Adam
Smith and apparent in the work of Immanuel Kant.79 On the absolute
If, however, we are speaking of the good or bad the outward deed gets from
its matter and relevant circumstances, it then relates to the will as the term and
goal of its act; in this manner it adds to the good or evil of the will, for every bent
and motion is completed by reaching its term and attaining its goal. Hence an act
of will is not complete unless given the opportunity it will finish the deed.
This may turn out to be impossible, nevertheless so long as the will is all set to
carry through with the act if it can, then the fact that it remains unfinished is in-
voluntary. What is [in]voluntary is counted neither for reward nor punishment in
doing well or ill, and likewise there is no subtraction from reward or punishment
when a man involuntarily does not succeed in carrying out a good or evil work.
18 AQUINAS, supra note 62, at 95, 97 (la2ae. 20, 4) (footnotes omitted). For St. Thomas,
the act is important especially as it reflects the condition of the will, but it appears to be
more than a negligible matter for moral evaluation. Something of his approach is to be
found in such remarks as Wharton's, on why the punishment of the attempt should be less
than that for the completed offense: "The attempt involves neither the duration of pre-
meditation, nor the obduracy of purpose, which belong to the crime when complete."
FRANCIS WHARTON, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW § 200, at 235 (1880); cf. 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *14 (set forth in that note).
78. As one scholar noted:
I believe that insofar as the harmed-based retributivists' view is based on the
common intuition that offenders who cause harm should be punished more vig-
orously than otherwise identical offenders who do not, those intuitions may be
explainable in terms that are irrelevant to desert. Specifically, the supposed
moral intuition may not be a moral intutition at all, but simply an intuition about
what is practical. When a person actually causes an injury, there is a greater rea-
son to believe that his conduct posed an unreasonable risk of injury than there
would have been in the absence of that injury-not overwhelmingly greater rea-
son, but nonetheless greater. Desert may be the same for two wrongful actors,
one of whom caused an injury and the other of whom did not, but as imperfect
administrators of justice we may feel more comfortable punishing only the actor
who caused harm to the full extent of this desert. He's the one we're sure of.
Heriot, supra note 15, at 147-48 (footnotes omitted); see also Rothstein, supra note 15, at
151 (arguing that consequences illumine moral judgments). Even some commentators
that criticize boosting punishment for harmful consequences may admit their evidentiary
value in establishing culpability. See Parker, supra note 12, at 273 ("In general, the pro-
duction of a harmful result is prima facie evidence that the conduct which produced it was
likely to produce it."); cf. Becker, supra note 12, at 292-93 (allowing result to establish
negligence for lack of a reliable alternative); Norvin Richards, Luck and Desert, in
MORAL LUCK, supra note 11, at 167 (arguing that moral luck actually affects our judg-
ments of desert, and not actual desert itself); Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and Moral Re-
sponsibility, in MORAL LUCK supra note 11, at 217 (arguing that harmful results indicate
blame, but do not augment blame itself).
The present Article finds a jurisdictional principle where Heriot and Rothstein find only
a practical consideration. Nevertheless, their analyses do expose a likely aspect of the
former.
79. See supra notes 21-37 and accompanying text. Many of the apparent contradic-
tions that lead Professor Murphy to find no coherent theory of punishment in Kant's
writing, see supra note 35, might yield to these two principles and to the general jurisdic-
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moral scale of wickedness, Alexander's and Alexandra's intentions and
acts may be identical.8° But for the wind only, they would both be mur-
derers or attempters of murder. Their moral guilt may be identical.
Nevertheless, we sense that they do not deserve equal criminal punish-
ment. To murder and to attempt murder are not equal offenses. Be-
tween these two diverse assessments is a shift of perspective. The first
reflects the perspective of God's government. As a matter of absolute
morality, both actors may deserve the same punishment. The second as-
81sessment, however, reflects the perspective of human government.
There, the different results of the acts signal a different civil punishment,
and perhaps other different human consequences." Our responsibilities
tional approach suggested here. The famous passage quoted at note 28, supra, may sug-
gest as much. Though emphasizing the unique value of the will for assessing the moral
quality of our actions, it does note that the "usefulness[, i.e., the faculty of the will actually
to achieve its goal] would be only its setting, as it were, [the will itself being the sparkling
jewel] so as to enable us to handle it more conveniently in commerce or to attract the at-
tention of those who are not yet connoisseurs." KANT, supra note 25, at 10. While not
detracting from absolute moral desert as the standard of perfect justice, the responsibili-
ties and limitations of civil government require that it handle the setting more than the
jewel itself.
80. Some medieval Christian commentators went so far as to suggest that even acts,
let alone results, have no effect on the morality of the actor. See EDGAR SHEFFIELD
BRIGHTMAN, MORAL LAWS 146-47 (1969); see also supra note 77 (discussing Abelard).
Perhaps the chief contemporary exponent of the contrary position is Professor Michael S.
Moore. For him, it is the doing of wrong acts that, in part, deserves moral blame. See
MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 44-59 (1993); Michael S. Moore, A Theory of
Criminal Law Theories, 10 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 115, 143, 177-84 (1990). Some question
whether he has made his case. See generally Douglas N. Husak, The Relevance of the Con-
cept of Action to the Criminal Law, 6 CRIM. L.F. 327 (1995) (reviewing MOORE, supra).
The jurisdictional approach suggested by the Sermon on the Mount explains why wrongful
acts may justly deserve criminal punishment though they independently may add little or
nothing to moral blameworthiness.
81. Adam Smith himself offers the first explanation for the "irregularity of senti-
ment": he described that God designed it to support the distinction between His and hu-
man governance; though in his explanation Smith discusses actions and intentions only,
not consequences. See SMITH, supra note 20, at 93.
82. See Nils Jareborg, Criminal Attempts and Moral Luck, 27 ISR. L. REV. 213,225-26
(1993). Jareborg contends:
Conduct ethics[, which includes a consideration of the harmful consequences of
acts,] is the type of ethical metaphysics most suitable for dealing with large,
anonymous moral communities and frequent types of acts. In assessing much of
human behaviour there is simply no time for deep investigations and analyses.
Normally we cannot count on loyal cooperation from the "suspect." A mentality
ethics is simply impracticable for most of our everyday moral judgments. There
must be something more tangible than a perhaps secret "inner life." A mentality
ethics could function as a private morality (a morality where the idea of reci-
procity within a moral community is absent), but hardly as a social morality. The
historical background of the idea of a mentality ethics suggests that the most im-
portant aspect of morality is the relation to God, not the relation to other per-
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and relationships in actual physical events, and our limited knowledge-
perhaps a limited knowledge especially suited to those responsibilities
and relationships-lead us to distinguish between the case of Alexander
and the case of Alexandra. This conclusion is not to confess that God's
view is truly moral and that of the "human jurisdiction" immoral.83
Rather, the views encompass different realms and scopes of authority.84
sons.
Id. See generally Mark Perlman, Punishing Acts and Counting Consequences, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 227 (1995) (arguing that consequent harm is relevant to criminal punishment apart
from the question of its relevance to morality); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Decline of
Cause, 76 GEO. L.J. 137 (1987) (distinguishing between assessing the moral qualities of
persons and the moral qualities of acts, the latter depending in part on consequential harm
and forming the basis for legal responsibility).
83. Though a variety of theories of punishment-deontological (retribution), conse-
quentialist (deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation), or mixed-may support the analy-
sis proposed in this Article, the retributive surely does. The retributive theory of criminal
punishment best reflects God's justice. See Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Christ's Atonement as the
Model for Civil Justice, 38 AM. J. J URIS. 221 (1993). If civil government is to dispense a
measure of God's justice, it too should adhere to the retributive approach. See id. at 221;
see also Romans 13:1-6. See generally Jerome Hall, Biblical Atonement and Modern
Criminal Law, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 694 (1987) (discussing retributive and other interpreta-
tions of the atonement); E.L. (Stacey) Hebden Taylor, Retribution, Responsibility and
Freedom: The Fallacy of Modern Criminal Law From a Biblical-Christian Perspective, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 51 (1981) (calling for the rejection of an ascendant "thera-
peutic ideology of crime control and treatment" in favor of traditional biblical retributiv-
ism). Conversely,
were a state to try to be morally neutral, it would be unable to inflict retributive
punishment. The demands of retribution require a legal institution not only to
take moral sides, but also to strive to implement a moral world in which people
are treated with the respect their value requires.
Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1701 (1992); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in Retri-
bution, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 283, 283-87 (1994) (arguing that a thorough going
retributivism is incompatible with a liberal theory of the state, a theory that elevates as
supreme the values of liberty and individual rights). There is no suggestion in the Bible
that human and divine justice differ in nature. Rather, the teaching is that human justice
reflects divine justice. The jurisdiction of humans is limited, and the justice may be done
with respect to only some matters, such as acts, but not pure will or character. But justice,
both human and divine, "execute[s] wrath upon him that doeth evil." Romans 13:4.
It may be that this jurisdictional but non-essential distinction between the retributivism
of God and that of His civil ministers may be described, in part at least, as one between
"subjectivist" "intent-based retributivism" on the one hand, and, on the other, some hy-
brid of that and "objectivist" "harm-based retributivism." See Kevin Cole, The Voodoo
We Do: Harm, Impossibility, and the Reductionist Impulse, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
31, 31-32 (1994) (supporting "intent-based retributivism" against "harm-based retributiv-
ism" in the criminal law of impossible attempts).
84. Several opinions from the United States Supreme Court accord with this analysis.
In rejecting an Eighth Amendment challenge to a Texas recidivist statute, the Court re-
marked, "if [the defendant] Rummel had attempted to defraud his victim of $50,000, but
had failed, no money whatsoever would have changed hands; yet Rummel would be no
less blameworthy, only less skillful, than if he had succeeded." Rummel v. Estelle, 445
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The Sermon on the Mount emphasizes the difference between God's
absolute justice and the more limited justice to be administered by hu-
man beings, including ministers in civil government. Christ does not
teach that the two forms of justice are of a different nature, nor does he
teach that humanly administered justice is to be despised in favor of the
divinely administered.85 Both realms of justice are truly just and express
U.s. 263, 276 (1980). In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prevents the introduction of a victim's impact statement during the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. See id. at 508-09. The Court overruled Booth
four years later in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-30 (1991). In Booth, Justice
Scalia wrote the following in a dissent joined by three others:
The Court holds that ... considerations not relevant to "the defendant's 'per-
sonal responsibility and moral guilt"' cannot be taken into account in deciding
whether a defendant who is eligible for the death penalty should receive it. It
seems to me, however-and, I think, to most of mankind-that the amount of
harm one causes does bear upon the extent of his "personal responsibility." We
may take away the license of a driver who goes 60 miles an hour on a residential
street; but we will put him in jail for manslaughter if, though his moral guilt is no
greater, he is unlucky enough to kill someone during the escapade.
Nor, despite what the Court says today, do we depart from this principle
where capital punishment is concerned. The Court's opinion does not explain
why a defendant's eligibility for the death sentence can (and always does) turn
upon considerations not relevant to his moral quilt. If a bank robber aims his
gun at a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death. If
the gun unexpectedly misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in both cases is iden-
tical, but his responsibility in the former is greater.
482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The Payne Court quoted from
this passage to help explain that resulting harm affects the seriousness of an offense and
the severity of its punishment, 501 U.S. at 819-21, though the Court later stated that such
harm goes toward assessing "the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness." Id.
at 825.
These opinions suggest that it is proper for civil government to consider harmful results
in assessing just punishment, notwithstanding its irrelevance to a moral assessment of guilt.
If murderers and attempted murderers are equally guilty morally, and yet we impose the
death penalty upon murderers only, the result of death has worked a "jurisdictional" shift,
assigning to the civil government a greater portion of the moral guilt to punish. But see
Model Penal Code Conference Transcript-Discussion Four, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 797 (1988).
Professor Ashworth remarked that
[jiust recently in England there was a driving accident which involved a small act
of carelessness: A motorcyclist, turning right, failed to keep a proper lookout.
He killed an old man, and the question came up to the court as to whether the
fine should be increased because of the death that resulted from what was essen-
tially a small act of carelessness, and the Lord Chief Justice .... said, essentially,
that you look intrinsically to the carelessness, pay no attention to the death, the
setting of the fine should depend solely on the carelessness ....
Id. at 809-10.
85. See Matthew 5:17-20. Jesus explained:
Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to
destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one
jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. Whosoever
therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so,
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the same nature of justice. Civil rulers are ministers of the wrath of God
86Himself and their judgment must reflect His. It is the scope of the jus-
tice, not its essence, that separates God's own from that share to be ad-
ministered by civil government."
If Alexander deserves more punishment from the civil government
than does Alexandra, this will be because the wind has worked not
"moral luck," but rather "jurisdictional luck," if it is luck at all. Results
signal what share of God's justice is to be administered by humans, not
the demands of total and absolute justice."
VI. JUST LUCK
As the Sermon on the Mount teaches, much of biblical law explicitly
expresses God's holiness and justice only in part. The partiality of the
law does not embrace a distortion of God's standards, but only a limited
application of them. The Sermon on the Mount requires that we see the
he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven: but whosoever shall do and
teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I say
unto you, That except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the
scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven.
Id.
86. See Witte & Arthur, supra note 2, at 451. The authors assert the following:
Like the theologians, early modern jurists accepted a general moral theory of
government and criminal law. God has created a moral or natural law .... State
magistrates are God's vice-regents in the world. They must represent and reflect
God's authority and majesty on earth. The laws which they promulgate must en-
capsulate and elaborate the principles of God's moral law, particularly as it is set
out in the Ten Commandments. The provisions of the criminal law, therefore,
must perforce parallel the provisions of the moral law. The purposes of criminal
punishment must perforce parallel the purposes of divine punishment. As Wil-
liam Blackstone put it, "the state's criminal law plays the same role in man's so-
cial life that God's moral law plays in man's spiritual life."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
87. There appears to be a tension between the jurisdictional understanding of crimi-
nal law and the classic understanding of retributive civil justice. The latter holds that
people should be punished because of (and only in proportion to) their moral de-
serts. This means that legal doctrines (such as that requiring a voluntary act or
that requiring punishable acts to be instances of wrongful act-types, like killings)
are best interpreted so as to get at the moral deserts of offenders ....
Michael S. Moore, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (1994). But
jurisdictional concerns act in derogation of morality on the merits. Unless the civil juris-
diction is tantamount to God's, it is not simply to "get at the moral deserts of offenders."
The most to be expected of it is to punish justly according to the component of desert as-
signed to its judgment.
88. Cf Moore, supra note 71, at 281 ("Results matter .... Culpability sets the outer
limits of desert and thus, of proportionate punishment. (Proximately) causing the harm
intended or risked brings one's deserts up to those limits ... wrongdoing is something of
the poor relation to culpability.").
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commands "Thou shalt not hate," or even "Thou shalt love," behind
"Thou shalt not kill," and "Thou shalt not entertain lust" behind "Thou
shalt not commit adultery." God's judgment according to the complete
standards of human goodness is more searching, and more momentous,
than that He has apportioned to human judges. Civil laws, however just,
will not duplicate the laws God has ordained for humankind as applied
by Himself.
As we have seen, then, the issue raised by the cases of Alexander and
Alexandra is one of jurisdiction, not of moral desert pure and simple.
Notwithstanding, if the standard of jurisdiction were arbitrary-such as,
redheads merit half the civil punishment meted out to other comparable
offenders, with the difference left to God alone to punish-the civil law
would be unjust. The previous part of this Article essayed to establish
that results in cases like those of Alexander and Alexandra are a non-
arbitary signal for distinguishing levels of civil jurisdiction in the criminal
law. Our situation in the physical world, and the concomitant limitation
on our abilities to discern and appreciate truth, support the use of results
as such a jurisdictional marker. So the cases of Alexander and Alexan-
dra raise a matter of "jurisdictional," not "moral," "luck." 89
That the luck involved is jurisdictional and not moral goes some dis-
tance to explain the justice of treating Alexander differently from Alex-
andra in the courts of civil justice. The Christian understanding knows
God as ultimate guarantor of perfect justice.9° The desert of a criminal,
whatever its extent, may be described as pay now or pay later; the pay-
ment will be made regardless.9 If Alexander and Alexandra merit the
89. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 227-29 (1986)
(characterizing as "just luck" that one but not the other of her two murderous shooters in
fact killed his target). At least one commentator, however, has argued that to characterize
the distinction like that between Alexander and Alexandra as one of luck may beg the
question. See Note, The Luck of the Law: Allusions to Fortuity in Legal Discourse, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1862, 1862-63 (1989) (arguing that the law often uses the concept of luck
to pass off disguised policy choices as simply a principle of avoiding the effects of chance).
90. See Galatians 6:7 (stating "[bje not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever
a man soweth, that shall he also reap").
91. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden,
Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1724 (1994).
Of special interest in this connection is Hale's statement of a presumption of in-
nocence and his justification of it in religious terms: that although God requires
the judge to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, where the evidence of
guilt is not conclusive the judge should acquit, even though he thereby risks ac-
quitting the guilty, since God himself is the final judge and, moreover, the guilty
person who has mistakenly been acquitted may repent and reform.
Id.; see also L.E. GOODMAN, ON JUSTICE: AN ESSAY IN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 69 (1991)
(explaining that the deserved social response to actions is only a part of God's ultimate
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same or similar punishment, eventually they shall receive it.
Nonetheless, that so important a jurisdictional matter, one affecting
profoundly the response of civil government to a crime, should rest upon
the wind still gives pause. It appears that nothing the defendants them-
selves did would be responsible for producing the "jurisdictional facts."
Though the standard for jurisdiction be not arbitrary, the presence of the
facts that meet the standard in a given case may seem arbitrary. In other
words, even if results matter, that there are results seems to flow from
factors that do not matter.
This aspect of civil justice in the cases of Alexander and Alexandra
needs light from the second doctrine we found adumbrated in the Ser-
mon on the Mount, the doctrine of Divine Providence. Though "[tihe
wind bloweth where it listeth, 9' the wind also is subject to the provi-
dence of God.93 The Christian faith that sees God as the author of justice
and civil officials as His ministers also sees the wind as obeying God's
command. It understands that God's hand ultimately determined that
Alexander's case implicates a greater measure of punitive civil authority
than does Alexandra's.
94
Divine Providence is a fundamental doctrine of the Christian faith and
a theme of the Bible.95 Three instances from biblical narratives should
help illustrate the doctrine. The first could lend the doctrine its name.
The Akedah, or Sacrifice of Isaac, tells of God's testing Abraham, calling
upon him to offer Isaac, the promised son through whom the covenant
blessings of Abraham were to be transmitted. When on the way to the
place of sacrifice Isaac asks his father, "Behold the fire and the wood: but
working of justice).
92. John 3:8.
93. Cf. Mark 4:39 ("And he arose, and rebuked the wind, and said unto the sea,
Peace, be still. And the wind ceased, and there was a great calm.").
94. Perhaps this understanding is a corollary of the still-popular belief as to Alexan-
der's victim: that though Alexander is responsible for the death, there is a sense in which
his victim's "time was up," and that the divinely appointed length of his life was fulfilled.
Likewise, one might say that in the case of Alexandra and Carol: "Providence charitably
averts the intended result." Burkhardt, supra note 7, at 561.
95. See generally 1 CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 197-210, 210-
28 (John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., Westminster Press 1960) (1559) (com-
prising two chapters, "God by His Power Nourishes and Maintains the World Created by
Him, and Rules Its Several Parts by His Providence" and "How We May Apply This Doc-
trine to Our Greatest Benefit"); CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 89-93 (TT 302-
14) (United States Catholic Conference 1994) (1994) (portion on Divine Providence);
JOHN FLAVEL, THE MYSTERY OF PROVIDENCE (First Banner of Truth 1976) (1678)
(classic Puritan treatment); 3 THE ILLUSTRATED BIBLE DICTIONARY 1292-93 (1980)
(biblical theology of Providence); J. RODMAN WILLIAMS, RENEWAL THEOLOGY 117-26
(1988) (definition and aspects of Providence).
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where is the lamb for a burnt offering?" Abraham tells Isaac, "My son,
God will provide himself a lamb for a burnt offering.... ,96 The angel of
the Lord stops Abraham at the point of killing Isaac:
And Abraham lifted up his eyes, and looked, and behold be-
hind him a ram caught in a thicket by his horns: and Abraham
went and took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering
in the stead of his son. And Abraham called the name of that
place Je-ho'vah-ji'reh: as it is said to this day, In the mount of
the LORD it shall be seen.97
"[I]t shall be seen"; that is, the Lord "shall provide." 9 God's providence
provided -foresaw the need for and supplied to fill that need-the sub-
stitute ram to die in Isaac's place and to typify the Lamb who would die
in the place of mankind.
The Bible portrays God's Providence as reaching all things,99 including
the actions of human beings. Two other famous instances of Divine
Providence from biblical narratives are the captivity of Joseph and the
betrayal of Judas. In the first, Joseph's jealous brothers sell him to Midi-
96. Genesis 22:7-8.
97. Id. 22:13-14.
98. From providire, Latin for "to foresee." See D.P. SIMPSON, CASSELL'S LATIN
DICTIONARY 484 (1968).
99. See Romans 8:28 ("And we know that all things work together for good to them
that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose."); see also JEREMIAH
BURROUGHS, THE RARE JEWEL OF CHRISTIAN CONTENTMENT 111-12 (Banner of Truth
Trust 1964) (1648). Burroughs teaches that
God by his providence rules the world, and governs all things in general,... it
reaches to every detail; not only to order the great affairs of kingdoms, but it
reaches to every man's family; ... it reaches to every condition; yea, to every
happening, to everything that falls out concerning you in every particular: not
one hair falls from your head, not a sparrow to the ground, without the provi-
dence of God. Nothing befalls you, good or evil, but there is a providence of the
infinite eternal [Just] Being in that thing; and therein is God's infiniteness, that it
reaches to the least things, to the least worm that is under your feet.
Id.; 1. CALVIN, supra note 95, at 208. Calvin states that
however all things may be ordained by God's purpose and sure distribution, for
us they are fortuitous.... [S]ince the order, reason, end, and necessity of those
things which happen for the most part lie hidden in God's purpose, and are not
apprehended by human opinion, those things, which it is certain take place by
God's will, are in a sense fortuitous.
Id. (emphasis added); see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 95, at
89 ( 302-08) (teaching that "there is a solidarity among all creatures [because] ... all
have the same Creator and are all ordered to his glory" (emphasis removed)); THE
ILLUSTRATED BIBLE DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 1292 ("God rules all natural forces
(Ps. 147:8f.), all wild animals (Jb. 38-41), and all happenings in the world, great and small,
from thunderstorms (Jb. 37; Ps. 29) and plagues (Ex. 7:3-11:10; 12:29ff.; Joel 2:25) to the
death of a sparrow (Mt. 10:29) or the fall of a lot (Pr. 16:33)."); WILLIAMS, supra note 95,
at 123 ("God in His providence directs His creation. He guides and governs all things.").
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anites, who sells him to Potiphar, the captain of Pharaoh's guard." ° As
Providence would have it, Joseph ends up Pharaoh's vizier and the offi-
cial whose wisdom, advice, and administrative skill save the Egyptians
and his own family from starvation. 1 After Jacob, father to Joseph and
his brothers, dies, Joseph's brothers become uncertain of the forgiveness
Joseph had offered them and ask him to confirm that forgiveness:
[A]nd now, we pray thee, forgive the trespass of the servants
of the God of thy father. And Joseph wept when they spake
unto him. And his brethren also went and fell down before his
face; and they said, Behold, we be thy servants. And Joseph
said unto them, Fear not: for am I in the place of God? But as
for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto
good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people
alive.' 2
God's providence, working through the actions of Joseph's brothers and
of others, used his captivity to avert starvation.
In the betrayal of Judas, God similarly works through human acts to
bring about His will. At the Last Supper, Christ remarks, "But, behold,
the hand of him that betrayeth me is with me on the table. And truly the
Son of man goeth, as it was determined: but woe unto that man by whom
he is betrayed!',
10 3
In both of these instances of Divine Providence, God acts as the One
who ultimately shapes human events, even when acting through humans
who themselves remain responsible for their acts."' Joseph's brothers do
100. See Genesis 39:1.
101. See id. at 41:1-57.
102. Id. at 50:17-20.
103. Luke 22:21-22; see also Acts 2:23 ("Him, being delivered by the determinate coun-
sel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and
slain ...."); cf. Habakkuk (prophesizing God's raising up of the Chaldeans to wreak by
violence His vengeance and also His punishing of the Chaldeans for the very same vio-
lence).
104. See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE ENCHIRIDION ON FAITH, HOPE AND LOVE 117-19
(Henry Paolucci ed., Regnery Gateway Co. 1961) (421) (comprising chapter entitled "The
Will of God, Which is Always Good, Is Sometimes Fulfilled Through the Evil Will of
Man"); I CALVIN, supra note 95, at 216-19 (comprising section entitled "God's providence
does not exculpate our wickedness"). Calvin continues by explaining:
Suppose a disease should carry off anyone whom he treated negligently, although
it was his duty to take care of him. Even though he knows that this person had
come to an impassable boundary, he will not on this account deem his misdeed
less serious; rather, because he did not faithfully discharge his duty toward him,
he will take it that through the fault of his negligence the latter had perished.
Where fraud or premeditated malice enters into the committing of either murder
or theft, he will even less excuse such a crime on the pretext of divine providence;
but in this same evil deed he will clearly contemplate God's righteousness and
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ask and receive forgiveness, Judas does receive condemnation. But God
Himself, consistent with human responsibility, shapes our destinies.
That, at least, is the orthodox Christian understanding."'
The operation of Divine Providence obviates "jurisdictional luck." It
is not meaningless, blind chance that leads to the distinction between the
man's wickedness, as each clearly shows itself.
Id. at 222; see also J.I. PACKER, EVANGELISM AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD 18-36
(1961) (comprising chapter entitled "Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility");
THE ILLUSTRATED BIBLE DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 1293 ("God's control is abso-
lute in the sense that men do only that which he has ordained that they should do; yet they
are truly free agents, in the sense that their decisions are their own, and they are morally
responsible for them (cf. Dt. 30:15 ff.)."); WILLIAMS, supra note 95, at 124-25 ("God
providentially directs the history of people and nations. This denies neither the freedom
of their actions nor the evil of their intentions. God fulfills His purpose through all. Both
God's predetermining will in every detail and their own totally free exercise of action are
underscored.").
An antinomy akin to that of Divine Providence and human responsibility received pos-
sibly its most famous philosophical treatment in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The
"Third [Conflict] of the Transcendental [Ideas]" poses the thesis, "Causality according to
the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the
world. A causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena."
Against this, it poses the antithesis, "There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in
the world happens solely according to the laws of nature." IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE
OF PURE REASON 270 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1979) (2d ed.
1787). Kant purports to demonstrate "[t]hat this antinomy is based on a mere illusion, and
that nature and freedom are at least not opposed." Id. at 329-30.
Of particular interest for our question is a passage from Calvin discussing Augustine.
The passage links the doctrines of providence and human responsibility to God's judgment
of humans according to the goodness of their wills.
And for modest minds this answer of Augustine will always be enough: "Since
the Father delivered up the Son, and Christ, his body, and Judas, his Lord, why in
this delivering up is God just and man guilty, unless because in the one thing they
have done, the cause of their doing it is not one?" But if some people find diffi-
culty in what we are now saying-namely, that there is no agreement between
God and man, where man does by God's just impulsion what he ought not to
do-let them recall what the same Augustine points out in another passage:
"Who does not tremble at these judgments, where God works even in evil men's
hearts whatever he wills, yet renders to them according to their deserts?" And
surely in Judas' betrayal it will be no more right, because God himself both
willed that his Son be delivered up and delivered him up to death, to ascribe the
guilt of the crime to God than to transfer the credit for redemption to Judas.
Therefore the same writer correctly points out, elsewhere, that in this examina-
tion God does not inquire into what men have been able to do, or what they have
done, but what they have willed to do, so that purpose and will may be taken into
account.
1 CALVIN, supra note 95, at 237 (footnotes omitted).
105. The Book of Esther, which makes no mention of God, is one of the greatest bibli-
cal accounts of Divine Providence. The salvation God works for the Jews there is so re-
markable a story of apparent coincidence and happenstance that the Book has no need of
mentioning Divine Providence. See generally Esther. The point would not be lost on
those familiar with the earlier books of the Bible.
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cases of Alexander and Alexandra.'06 Providence is at work. 7 Jurisdic-
tional providence, not moral luck, leads to the distinction. Just as the
warrant for greater civil authority in the presence of results is not arbi-
trary, so the presence of results in a given case is not arbitrary. Both are
ordained by the God of perfect justice and goodness.
This interworking of Divine Providence and "jurisdictional facts" is
presupposed in biblical law. Recall the rule that requires two or three
witnesses to establish incriminating facts in court 0 ' Offenses that lacked
these witnesses were to escape punishment at the hands of human beings.
The number of witnesses to an offense had nothing to do with its wick-
edness. Lack of witnesses might have something to do with the capacity
of humans to do justice-much as the case with results. By this limita-
tion, God alone remains the guarantor of eventual perfect justice. None-
theless, the biblical understanding of God's Providence underlies the jus-
tice of applying the rule in human courts in any given case.'1 9 Two
equally culpable offenders may receive opposite judgments as a conse-
106. See 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 195-96 (Mircea Eliade ed., 1987). This
work interrelates chance and the Divine Providence:
Chance events, beyond human ratiocination and calculations, disclose the radical
uncertainty that (at least from the human perspective) is present at the heart of
reality. The interpretation of what chance is depends on whether one's world-
view is religious or nonreligious. The fundamental unknowability of events-
their mystery-can inspire awe. The religious mind has perceived in chance some-
thing sacred or a manifestation of the divine will. Some have placed chance
within the governance of divine providence. Others reject it in deference to the
same divine providence, arguing that what happens has already been determined
by the transcendent scheme.
Id.; see also 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 355-56 (James Hastings ed.,
1925) (emphasizing in the discussion of "chance" its dependence upon the limitations of
human knowledge and not upon some lack of causation).
107. And all the more surely when a human death is the result. See Exodus 21:12-13
("He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death. And if a man lie not
in wait, but God deliver him into his hand; then I will appoint thee a place whither he shall
flee."). God Himself determines our days. Note, of course, that this fact does not render
God, instead of Alexander, responsible for Carl's death. See supra notes 96-100 and ac-
companying text.
108. See supra text accompanying note 57.
109. The belief in Divine Providence was a basic presupposition of English jurispru-
dence, at least in the seventeenth century. See Berman, supra note 91, at 1722. One rea-
son Justice Hale would "rather through ignorance of the truth of the fact or the unevi-
dence of it acquit ten guilty persons than condemn one innocent" was that "the hand of
divine justice in the way of His providence may reach in after time a guilty person." Id. at
1706 n.147. A similar Jewish understanding sees God's providence at work in punishment
and reward. See, e.g., 8 SALO WITFMAYER BARON, A SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY
OF THE JEWS 101-04 (2d ed. 1958) (discussing the thought of medieval Jewish philoso-
phers); 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1279-86 (1972) (discussing providence generally,
but noting its pronounced retributive aspect).
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quence of Divine Providence." °
Divine Providence, or something very like it, is presupposed in matters
some have described as instances of moral luck. Our ability and inclina-
tion to hold ourselves and others accountable, though affected by hap-
penstance, is not just a matter of resigning ourselves to this state of af-
fairs as an unavoidable puzzle in holding humans to be accountable
moral agents."' Instead, it is just for the actor to be judged, in part be-
110. Ironically, the most explicit connection between providence and civil punishment
in cases like Alexander's and Alexandra's comes from a pagan:
The statute of wounding, then, shall run thus. If anyone intend and purpose
the death of a person with whom he is on friendly terms, such person not being
one against whom the law arms his hand, and fail to kill, but inflict a wound, he
who wounds with such intent deserves no mercy, and shall be made to stand his
trial for homicide with as little scruple as though he had killed. But the law will
show its reverence for his not too wholly unpropitious fortune and the tutelary
power which has, in mercy to both wounder and wounded, preserved the one
from a fatal hurt and the other from incurring a curse and a disaster; it will show
its gratitude and submission to that power by sparing the criminal's life and
dooming him to lifelong banishment to the nearest state, where he shall enjoy his
revenues in full. He must make payment of whatever damage he have caused to
the wounded, the amount being fixed by the court before which the case is tried,
and this court shall be composed of the same persons as would have tried the
homicide had death followed as a consequence of the wounds inflicted.
PLATO, Laws, in, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1435-36 (876e-877b) (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1961) (A.E. Taylor trans.
1934).
111. Michael S. Moore has demonstrated that a consistent application of the doctrine
that moral luck is to be eliminated from moral judgments would remove all human re-
sponsibility. One's character, one's health, one's opportunity to act, one's ability to
choose, all depend, at least in part, upon luck. "The blunt fact is that we have no more
control over all the factors necessary in order to choose to kill than we do over all the fac-
tors necessary for us to kill." Moore, supra note 71, at 277. Moore uses this argument as a
reductio ad absurdum in support of his argument that penal retribution for harm is proper.
See id. But for our purposes, the argument highlights the pervasiveness of Providence in
affecting criminal liability. See Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Luck and the Virtues of
Impure Agency, in MORAL LUCK, supra note 11, at 241 (demonstrating that "moral luck"
is "a fact of our moral situation and our human kind of agency").
This pervasiveness has led Lloyd L. Weinreb to suggest that positing a normative natu-
ral order, an order that shapes the circumstances of our actions according to our desert,
might provide one way to render coherent our law of criminal responsibility. See Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1986, at 47. He mentions the Christian Doctrine of Providence as including such
an order. See id. at 75. Providence is one way to escape a devastating contradiction:
Desert ... seems to require that a person's acts be both free and determinate.
Unless they are free, the person [sic] cannot be said to be morally responsible,
and desert is out of the question. By the same token, a person is not responsible
for circumstances beyond his control-circumstances, that is, that are not the
product of his freedom. But then, unless the conditions in which a person acts
are fully determined according to his desert, they are arbitrary from a moral
point of view; furthermore, unless such deserved conditions fully determine his
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cause the stage, setting, and props are designed by the critic. Perhaps
this notion is easiest to grasp in cases where God's Providence offers no
Act of God, but rather holds things on even keel. That too is truly God's
Providence."' The uniformity of nature we take for granted in moral and
action, an attribution of desert according to how he exercises his freedom also is
morally arbitrary. If freedom requires desert, it seems to require that the exer-
cise of freedom itself be determinate. But if desert requires freedom, that is a
contradiction. Desert cannot depend on freedom and at the same time freedom
depend on desert.
Id. at 74. Weinreb claims that Providence ties freedom to desert, as if to suggest that hu-
man freedom is of no fundamental concern to the doctrine. See id. at 75-77; see also
THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 38 (1979). Nagel states that
[t]he inclusion of consequences in the conception of what we have done is an
acknowledgement that we are parts of the world, but the paradoxical character of
moral luck which emerges from this acknowledgment shows that we are unable
to operate with such a view, for it leaves us with no one to be. The same thing is
revealed in the appearance that determinism obliterates responsibility.
Id.
Two aspects of the Doctrine of Providence discussed in this Article bear emphasis re-
garding these matters. First, the orthodox Doctrine of Providence is not in derogation of
responsible human freedom. In a mystery, both coexist. See supra notes 96-100 and ac-
companying text. Second, the Providence that governs the jurisdictional facts of the sort
that distinguishes the cases of Alexandra and Alexander need not array circumstances ac-
cording to the actors' deserts. Other good and just reasons may lead God to affect harm-
ful results one way or another. Because the results are jurisdictional and not "moral,"
they need not themselves be driven by desert. God has other means at His disposal to as-
sure justice is done; this truth makes possible the jurisdictional approach in the first place.
Similarly, the providential governance of harmful results need not be driven by the desert
of the victim, or after a fashion humans would ordinarily relate to desert. See, e.g., 1 Kings
14:12-13. Sometimes early death is a good reward:
Arise thou therefore, get thee to thine own house: and when thy feet enter into
the city, the child shall die. And all Israel shall mourn for him, and bury him: for
he only of Jeroboam shall come to the grave, because in him there is found some
good thing toward the Lord God of Israel in the house of Jeroboam.
Id.
112. See Colossians 1:17 ("And [Jesus Christ] is before all things, and by him all things
consist."); see also I CALVIN, supra note 95, at 199. Calvin asserted that God's providence
is seen in exceptions that prove the rule:
[W]hen we read that at Joshua's prayers the sun stood still in one degree for two
days [Josh. 10:13], and that its shadow went back ten degrees for the sake of King
Hezekiah [II Kings 20:11 or Isa. 38:8], God has witnessed by those few miracles
that the sun does not daily rise and set by blind instinct of nature but that he him-
self, to renew our remembrance of his fatherly favor toward us, governs its
course. Nothing is more natural than for spring to follow winter; summer, spring;
and fall, summer-each in turn. Yet in this series one sees such great and uneven
diversity that it readily appears each year, month, and day is governed by a new,
a special, providence of God.
Id.; see also 3 THE ILLUSTRATED BIBLE DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 1292 ("[T]he
regularity of the natural order is thought of as depending directly upon the divine will (cf.
Gn. 8:22) .... God's providential government of the created order proclaims his wisdom,
power, glory and goodness (Pss. 8:1; RV; 19:1-6; Acts 14:17; Rom. 1:19f.)"). In his theo-
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legal judgments is just that-granted.
VII. THE VIEW FROM THE TOP
The cases of Alexander and Alexandra-Alex and Lexie by now, to be
sure-present an odd prospect. From one vantage point, we are sure
that both are equally guilty, and that the wind could not make a differ-
ence in their desert: they both performed the same act with the same in-
tent. From another vantage point, we are sure that they are by no means
equally guilty, and that the wind has made all the difference: Alexander
is a murderer, Alexandra is not. How does one reconcile these seemingly
irreconcilable conclusions?
This Article has suggested that both conclusions may be true, properly
understood. While in absolute moral terms, both actors may share equal
guilt, in the moral region assigned to civil government for enforcement,
each bears different guilt. This harmony is not due to a different concept
of justice, to the invasion of tort into criminal law, or to some other dis-
tinction between the substance of justice before God and before civil
government. What is at work is a jurisdictional principle. Civil govern-
ment administers God's justice, but only in part. The two vantage points
view the cases from these respective jurisdictions.
The wind provides the distinction in the case of Alexander and Alex-
andra. But the wind is no blind force driven by chance. It is impelled by
the hand of God. It is the same hand that maintains physical reality, that
keeps both actors alive, that determines the span of Carl's life. The Su-
preme Judge "3 is also the Supreme Assignment Clerk.
The explanation tendered in this Article may strike many as based on
fantasy. It is that fantasy, however, that by and large undergirds Western
morals and legal systems. The Christian appreciation of the cases of Al-
exander and Alexandra does explain our reactions and our treatment of
the cases they exemplify. Fantasy or not, the Christian view must prove
helpful for understanding a culture based largely upon the Bible.
On the other hand, many may hold that the Christian faith is true. For
logical treatise, J. Rodman Williams states the following:
God in His providence preserves His creation. He preserves, sustains, upholds.
This relates particularly to the being of what He has made .... Structures and
laws are but continuing sequences that would break down immediately without a
power that restrains them. The revolution of the earth around the sun, the
earth's turning on its axis, the oxygen level in the atmosphere-whatever exists
by God's creative act-would break apart, dissolve, go back into chaos if God did
not sustain and preserve.
WILLIAMS, supra note 95, at 118-19.
113. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
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them, this Article might present not just a model but also a guide to the
truth regarding cases like Alexander's and Alexandra's. And here they
may be led to agree with G.K. Chesterton: "Thoroughly worldly people
never understand even the world ....
114. GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 22 (1943).
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